We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence.Unawareness, extensive-form games, extensive-form rationalizability

Aviad Heifetz

Burkhard Schipper

Martin Meier

English

Research Papers in Economics

A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games,

Analogy-based expectation equilibrium,

Backward induction, normal form perfection and explicable equilibria,

Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory,

Dynamic games with perfect awareness information,

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Game theory: Analysis of con ict,

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Interactive unawareness,

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On rationalizability in extensive games,

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Relying on the information of interested parties,

Schipper (2011b). Conditional dominance in dynamic games with unawareness,

Stable equilibria and forward induction,

Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalizability principle,

Strong belief and forward induction reasoning,

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

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Research Papers in Economics