Since 2009, the unemployment rate in the United States has remained above eight percent, which means that more than twelve million individuals have been looking for work at any given time. With so many affected individuals, unemployment has become an issue of public concern, particularly as stories describing employers refusing to consider currently unemployed candidates for job opportunities have proliferated. In response to these trends, about twenty states and the federal government have passed, or are considering, legislation designed to prohibit employers from discriminating against individuals based on their employment status.
The goal of this Article is to survey the legislative activity, identify the factors driving it, and analyze its potential ramifications. I contend that it is unreasonable to project that this legislation will significantly reduce unemployment because there is only anecdotal data regarding the prevalence of discrimination against unemployed candidates in hiring and, regardless of the frequency of such a practice, none of the proposed or enacted legislation directly promotes job creation. However, I argue that the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation is a positive example of interest convergence in that it benefits the economy by reducing arbitrary discrimination in hiring and long-term unemployment. Furthermore, such legislation expresses a set of positive societal values and protects members of constitutionally-protected groups who are likely disproportionately impacted by current-employment requirements. I then discuss why the concerns advanced by the business community are overstated given the generally limited scope of the legislation, the lack of a private right of action, and the legally-approved uses of employment status as a proxy for characteristics about which a business might reasonably care. In sum, when taking an objective look, the anti-unemployment discrimination legislation is neither panacea, placebo, nor poison
