Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) applications monitor
and control a wide range of safety-related functions. These include energy generation where failures could have
significant, irreversible consequences. They also include the control systems that are used in the manufacture of
safety-related products. In this case bugs in an ICS/SCADA system could introduce flaws in the production of
components that remain undetected before being incorporated into safety-related applications. Industrial Control
Systems, typically, use devices and networks that are very different from conventional IP-based infrastructures.
These differences prevent the re-use of existing cyber-security products in ICS/SCADA environments; the
architectures, file formats and process structures are very different. This paper supports the forensic analysis of
industrial control systems in safety-related applications. In particular, we describe how forensic attack analysis is
used to identify weaknesses in devices so that we can both protect components but also determine the information
that must be analyzed during the aftermath of a cyber-incident. Simulated attacks detect vulnerabilities; a risk-based
approach can then be used to assess the likelihood and impact of any breach. These risk assessments are then used
to justify both immediate and longer-term countermeasures