WTO; international agreements; international trade; governance

John S. Odell

English

Research Papers in Economics

After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.

Analytic Uncertainty and International Cooperation: Theory and Application to International Economic Policy Coordination.

Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes.

Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation.

Bounded Rationality in the World Political Economy. In Governing the World’s Money,

Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation.&quot;

Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation: negotiation analysis and the case of epistemic communities.

Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions.

Compliance and PostAgreement Bargaining.&quot;

Compliance with International Agreements.

Cooperation and Governance in International Trade: the strategic organizational approach.

Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.

Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region.

Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games.&quot;

Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative Responses to the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.

Economic Interdependence, Relative Gains, and International Cooperation: The Case of Monetary Policy Coordination.

Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements.

Formal Individual Mediation and the Negotiators' Dilemma: Tommy Koh at the Law of the Sea Conference&quot;,

Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits.

Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the E.C.'s Internal Market.&quot;

International Cooperation in Exchange Rate Management: Coordination of U.S.

International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment.

International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses.&quot; World Politics 44: 466-96 41 Milner, Helen V.

International Threats and Internal Politics: Brazil,

International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiations.

Negotiating by Consensus: Developments

Negotiating the Law of the Sea: Lessons in the Art and Science of Reaching Agreement.

Negotiating the New Ocean Regime.

Negotiating the Rapids: The Dynamics of Regime Formation.

Negotiating the World Economy.

Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society.&quot;

Positive Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations.

Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord.

The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge:

The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht.

The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions.

The Manager as Negotiator.

The Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. International Organization.

The Seattle Impasse and the Implications for the World Trade Organization.

Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions.&quot;

Theories of International Regimes.

Making and Breaking Impasses in International Regimes. The WTO, Seattle and Doha

http://www.eui.eu/ERPA/RSCAS/../../RSCAS/WP-Texts/03_01.pdf

Making and Breaking Impasses in International Regimes. The WTO, Seattle and Doha

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Research Papers in Economics