Las políticas antimonopolio y la promoción de la competencia en el Perú 

Abstract

This article provides an assessment of the trade-offs and challenges that antitrust authorities currently face in Peru. It examines the extent to which the structural reforms have succeeded in removing entry barriers and reducing the likelihood of collusion. It also examines the institutional structures of antitrust enforcement. The argument is that reforms have led to higher levels of investment and entry, creating a more competitive environment. Yet, macroeconomic stabilization has opened new avenues for collusion, enhancing the threat of retaliation among oligopolists as a result of increased price visibility and lower discount factors. Deregulation and trade liberalization have led to more contestable markets and potential competition is more effective now in disciplining the incumbent firms. But the scope of this mechanism is limited, by definition, to markets for tradeables. On the other hand, with a strong presidential system, a weak judiciary, and limited checks and balances, the antitrust agency appears to be vulnerable to “capture” from interest groups. Furthermore, both the conception that inspires antitrust and the legislation itself show some flaws, such as the refusal to adopt a merger policy, a limited focus on procedural aspects that leaves efficiency concerns aside and a groundless hostility against welfare-enhancing forms of inter-firm cooperation. This argument is illustrated with a brief assessment of the jurisprudence that has emerged during the first three years of antitrust enforcement. The article concludes with some proposals that could increase the effectiveness of competition policies in Perú.