A. Roth

I. Er’ev

English

Research Papers in Economics

A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence,&quot;

A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.,&quot;

A Theol~y of Adaptive Economic Behavior. New York/London Cambridge

A Theory of Learning, Experimentation, and Equilibrium in Games,&quot;

Acquisition of Skill: An Analysis of Learning Curves,&quot;

Adaptive Algorithms andStochastic Approximations. Berlin, Springer. [translated from the French by Stephen

Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Normal Form Games,&quot;

Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games,&quot; working paper,

An 'Evolutionary' Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination,&quot;

An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,&quot;

An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods&quot;,

An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining,&quot;

An Iterative Method of Solving a Game,&quot;

Animal Intelligence: An Experimental Study of the Associative Processes in Animals,&quot;

Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory,&quot;

Automaton Theory and Modeling of Biological Systems.

Bargaining and Market Behavior in

Bargaining Experiments,&quot;

Bargaining Theory,&quot;

Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games,&quot;

Bayesian Learning Without Common Priors and Convergence to Nash Equilibria,&quot;

Can Evolutionary Dynamics Explain Free Riding in Experiments,&quot;

Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games,&quot;

Designing Economic Agents that Act Like Human Agents: A Behavioral Approach to Bounded Rationality,&quot;

Discriminability and Stimulus Generalization,&quot;

Evolution and the Theory of Games. New York/London,

Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior,&quot;

Evolutionary Games in Economics,&quot;

Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions,&quot;

Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities,&quot;

Learning Mixed Equilibria,&quot;

Learning the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy,&quot;

Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game,&quot; Games Econ. Behav.

Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games,&quot;

New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization,&quot;

On Designing Economic Agents that Behave Like Human Agents,&quot;

Potential Games,&quot;

Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium,&quot;

Self-Confirming Equilibrium,&quot;

Some Topics in Two-Person Games,&quot;

Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism,&quot;

Spontaneous Alternation Behavior,&quot;

Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium,&quot;

Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics,&quot;

Stochastic Models for Learning.

Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection Principles, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games,&quot;

The Adaptive Character of Thought,

The Effect of Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game,&quot;

The Evolution of Conventions,&quot;

The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory,&quot;

Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Run

http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4387.pdf

Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Run

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Research Papers in Economics