Robert S. Gibbons

English

Research Papers in Economics

A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs,

An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations.”

Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the

Balancing Performance Measures.”

Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity.”

Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making in

Clinical Papers in Organizational Economics.” Forthcoming

Companion to Organizations.

Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete

Comparing Productivity Growth: An Exploration of

Complementarity in Organizations.” Forthcoming

Consensus Building: How to Persuade a

Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations.”

Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.”

Corporate Resource Allocation.” Forthcoming

Corruption in Public and Private Governance.” ” Forthcoming

Decentralized learning from failure.”

Development, geography, and economic theory.

Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive

Economic Models of Corporate Governance.” Forthcoming

Economic Theory of Teams.

Experimental Organizational Economics.” Forthcoming

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure.

Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?”

Hierarchies and the Division of Labor.” Forthcoming

Human Resources at Hewlett-Packard (A)

Hybrid Modes of Organization: Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and other ‘strange’ animals.” Forthcoming

Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement.”

Influence through ignorance.”

Inside the Firm: The Inefficiencies of Hierarchy.

Insider Econometrics: A Roadmap to Estimating Empirical Models of Organizational Performance.” Forthcoming

Inter-Firm Contracts: Evidence.” Forthcoming

Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm.” Forthcoming, American Economic Review.

Learning How to Cooperate:

Managerial Incentive Problems—A Dynamic Perspective.”

Managers, Not MBAs.

Market Power, Scale Economies and Productivity: Estimates from a Panel of Establishment Data.&quot;

Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.

Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work.”

Measurement, Coordination, and Learning in a Multiplant Network.” In

Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries.

Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm Effects in

Moral Hazard and Observability,”

Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership,

On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for

On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with

Optimal Statistical Decisions.

Organizational Design: Decision Rights and Incentive

Organizational or Frictional Equilibria, X-Efficiency, and the Rate of Innovation.”

Personnel Economics.” Forthcoming

Political Models of Organizational Decision-Making.”

Productivity and Technical Change. Cambridge:

Productivity Differences Across Employers: The Roles of Employer Size,

Property Rights.” Forthcoming

Public Bureaucracy and the Theory of Political Control.” Forthcoming

Relational Contracts and the Origins of Organizational Capabilities.” Forthcoming

Relational Incentive Contracts.” Forthcoming

Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement.”

Restructuring and productivity growth in

Risk, uncertainty, and profit.

Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery.”

Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and

Subjective Performance Measures in

Taking the Dare.” The

Team theory, garbage cans and real organizations: some history and prospects of economic research on decision-making in organizations.”

Technological Innovation and Organizations.” Forthcoming

The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago:

The convergence of profits in the long run: inter-firm and inter-industry comparisons.”

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:

The Economics of Welfare.

The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity:

The Firm as a Subeconomy.”

The Firm as an Incentive System.”

The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Second edition.

The Tenuous Trade-Off Between Risk and Incentives,&quot;

The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I.” Unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College.

The Vertical Integration of Production:

Theory and Evidence in Internal Labor Markets.” Forthcoming

Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership:

Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.”

Transaction Cost Economics.” Forthcoming

Vertical Integration and Market Structure.” Forthcoming

Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process.”

Why Do Firms Differ,

Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence

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Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence

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Research Papers in Economics