Dong Lee

Thomas E. Borcherding

English

Research Papers in Economics

(forthcoming 2002). The growth of real government. Handbook of Public Choice. London: Edward Elgar.

A pure theory of local government expenditure.

A rational theory of the size of government.

A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence.

American government expenditures: A historical perspective.

An economic analysis of Swedish government expenditure.

Bureaucracy and representative government.

Bureaucrats versus voters: On the political economy of resource allocation by direct democracy.

Changes in the real size of government: US experience 1948-1989. Carleton Economic Papers 93-01.

Checks unbalanced: The quiet side of public spending.

Deadweight costs and the size of government.

Director’s law of public income distribution.

Disentangling the demand function from the production function for local public services.

Do governments grow when they become more efficient? Evidence from tax withholding.

Excessive government spending in the U.S.: Facts and theories.

Explaining the growth of government.

Government and cost of exchange.

Grundlegung der politshen Oekonomie.

Measuring the transaction sector in the Amrerican economy, 1870-1890. In

On the nature and measurement of fiscal illusion: A survey. In

Political resource allocation, controlled agendas and the status quo.

Pressure groups and redistribution.

Private demands for public goods.

Public Choice II. Cambridge:

Public policies, pressure groups and deadweight costs.

Public spending in the 20th century. Cambridge:

Rates of productivity change and the growth of state and local governments. In

Redistribution policy and expansion of the public sector.

Regulation as taxation.

Searching for Leviathan: A reply and some further reflections.

Tax instruments as constraints on the disposition of public revenues.

Tests of a rational theory of the size of government.

The causes of government expenditure growth: A survey of the U.S.

The cost disease and government growth: Qualifications to Baumol. Public Choice 89(October):

The cost disease versus Leviathan explanations of rising government cost.

The demand for local public goods: Elasticities of demand for own price, cross price and income.

The demand for the services of non-federal governments.

The effects on public spending of the divisibility of public outputs in consumption, bureaucratic power, and the size of the tax-sharing group. In

The expanding public sector: Some contrary evidence.

The flypaper effect and other anomalies.

The growing cost of government: A test of two explanations.

The growth of competitive governments.

The growth of government in the United States: An economic historian’s perspective.

The growth of government.

The microeconomics of unbalanced growth: The anatomy of urban crisis.

The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge:

The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities. New Haven:

Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan.

Transaction cost in history.

Wagner’s hypothesis in time-series and cross-section perspectives: Evidence from ‘real data’ for 115 countries.

Wagner’s law, relative prices and the size of the public sector.

Why does government’s share of national income grow? An assessment of the recent literature on the U.S. experience.

The Growth of the Relative Size of Government

http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/rdschool/papers/2002-05.pdf

The Growth of the Relative Size of Government

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Research Papers in Economics