Financial intermediation, Mutual insurance , Safety nets , Microfinance , Microcredit

Conning, Jonathan

Kevane, Michael

English

Research Papers in Economics

Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net?’, World Bank Research Observer,

Capital for the Poor: the Role of Monitoring’,

Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing’,

Collusion and Group Lending with Moral Hazard’,

Collusion and the Theory of Organizations’,

Commodity Risk Management’,

Community Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets’, World Development,

Consumption Smoothing and Extended Families’, University College London, working paper.

Expenditure Decentralization and the Delivery of Public Services in Developing Countries’,

Farmer Cooperatives as Behavior Toward Risk’,

Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring: A Simple Example’, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly,

Financial Intermediation for the Poor : Survey of the State of the Art’, African Economic Policy Discussion Paper,

Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector’,

Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral’,

In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural Ethiopia’,

Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing’,

Intrahousehold Allocation and Farming in Southern Ghana’,

Large cash transfers to the elderly in

Money and Capital in Economic Development,

Monitoring Agents with Other Agents’,

Monitoring by Delegates or by Peers? Joint Liability Loans under Moral Hazard’, Center for Development Economics Discussion paper No.161,

Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer

More for the Poor is Less for the Poor: The Politics of Targeting’, Policy Research Working Paper, 1799: 26, World Bank Development Research Group Poverty and Human Resources,

Mutual Insurance with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies’, Working Paper,

Outreach, Sustainability and Leverage in Monitored and PeerMonitored lending’,

Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets’, World Bank Economic Review,

Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing’,

Reciprocity without Commitment: Characterization and Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements’,

Regulating Trade among Agents’,

Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation

Risk Sharing, Quasi Credit, and the Enforcement of Informal Contracts’,

The Choice Between Public and Private Debt: An Analysis of Post-Deregulation Corporate Financing

The Development of the Pawnshop Industry in East Asia’,

The Hazards of Piecemeal Reform: British Civil Courts and the Credit Market in Colonial India’,

The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Succeeds in the West and Fails Almost Everywhere Else, Perseus Books Group,

The Political Economy of Targeting’,

Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit’,

Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth’,

West Africa’s Microcredit Boom: Suggestions for Implementation and Policy from

Why isn't there more Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?

http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/rp2002/dp2002-28.pdf

Why isn't there more Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?

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Research Papers in Economics