Privately and socially optimal take-overs when acquisition and exclusion strategies are endogenous.

Abstract

The case for one share, one vote is quite robust to the way the takeover game is played, provide done goes all the way and allows not just toeholds or multiple bids and revisions but also bargaining. But a rule that exclusion should never harm the non-voting shares, or tha tthese shares should be taken over at the pre-bidprice,will do as well, without so severely curtailing a firm's room for security design. Under either rule, all privately beneficial takeovers are socially desirable and vice versa, and the value gains are shared fairly between the current shareholders and the bidder.Research; Impact; Determinants; Firms; Product; Market; Competition; Ownership; Performance; Characteristics; Belgian firms; Control; Companies; Firm performance; International; Portfolio; Variables; Size; Growth; Model; Job; Pricing; Factors; Rules; Data; Benchmarking; Prices; Value; Models; Work; Bias; Variance; Trade; Estimator; Bids; Optimal; Takeovers; Strategy;