Price and prejudice : a legal and economic approach to rebates

Abstract

Defence date: 13 January 2014Examining Board: Professor Giorgio Monti, European University Institute Professor Petros Mavroidis, European University Institute Professor Luis Ortiz Blanco, Garrigues & College of Europe Professor Daniel Sokol, Leivin College of Law, University of Florida.The thesis proposes an analysis of the evolving approach to abuse of dominance and monopolization through the case study of loyalty discounts as example of controversy both in the literature as well as in the case law. Much of this controversy draws from the fact that fidelity discounts constitute a price-based practice having similar effects to non price-based conducts such as exclusive dealing or tying. Therefore, evaluating their competitive impact necessarily requires a comprehensive assessment of vertical restraints as a whole. While the more economic approach to competition policy has influenced authorities' perception of rebates, different legal systems allow for different degrees of evolution in their actual assessment. This research puts into question the need for a hard law reform when it comes to practices calling for an economic assessment, given that the neutrality and consistency of economic tools may enable a soft law shifting of competition policy regimes