We review the argument made by Clark and Chalmers in <I>Analysis</I> for a limited externalism and extend their argument from declarative knowledge to procedural knowledge

Fulda, Joseph S.

English

Cognitive Sciences ePrint Archive

"The Extended Mind"—Extended
Joseph S. Fulda
"Philosophy," it has been said, "is the finding of reasons for what one believes by
instinct."  In January, my Internet access was cut off for four days and I felt as if a
part of me was gone, a part of my mind, with all the disorientation that one might
expect.  Later that month, I read a fascinating article by Clark and Chalmers [1] that
gave me the reasoning for what I had believed by instinct.  The extended mind is
partly an artificial mind, composed of the brain and artifact alike and as such Clark
and Chalmers' excursion into the philosophy of mind is equally a contribution to the
philosophy of artificial intelligence.
We present their theory here and then extend it further so as to explain my impaired
mental function during Internet blackouts.  Clark and Chalmers introduce their subject
thus:
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?  The
question invites two standard replies.  Some accept the boundaries of
skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the
mind.  Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the
meaning of our words 'just ain't in our head', and hold that this
externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind.
Both views invite counterarguments of considerable weight and Clark and Chalmers
have fashioned, with formidable ingenuity, a middle ground that does not appear to
be susceptible to these standard objections.  Whether other objections to their views
will prevail, or whether their theory will withstand the test of time, is, of course,
unknown:  Philosophical arguments that have appeared cogent for centuries have
been destroyed by fleeting flashes of inspiration or genius—witness Gettier's
demolition of the idea that 'knowledge' is 'justified, true belief' or Kripke's demolition
of the idea that a 'name' is shorthand for a 'bundle of properties' of the named.  It is
certain, in fact, that my extension of Clark and Chalmers, as powerful an explanation
of certain mental phenomena as it may seem, will, not having undergone rigorous
prior peer review, in time be seen as flawed.  My hope is that the flaws will not be
*
 Although the term "cyberpunk future" is from the Analysis paper, it is not hard to
imagine.  In [2], Robert Fox of the ACM informs us of this interesting Cal Tech
experiment:
A computer chip that interfaces directly with brain cells via standard
integrated-circuit techniques has been developed and tested in rats....
Pitted with 16 depressions attached to a tiny electrode connected to a
computer, researchers filled each depression with nerve-flourishing
substances, then placed neurons from embryonic rat brains into each
depression and allowed them to grow.  Neuron extensions grew over
the walls separating these wells, made connections with each other as
they would in a developing brain, and detected individual firings
between nerve cells,....  Eventually, say researchers, the chips could
be used to enhance various brain functions.
fatal, that the line of analysis here put forth—based on a paradigm from AI—will be
sustainable, even though the fine print of a philosophical position—extensive
modifications, refinements, exceptions, and cautions will be required—as it always
is.
Clark and Chalmers introduce their theory by considering a nontrivial mental task,
rotation, which for the strength of the argument, we will take as reflection, that is
rotation along the z axis.  Consider, they say, three ways of performing this task: (1)
the old-fashioned way, by performing the reflection "in one's head," (2) the modern
way, by reflecting the object on a computer screen using a "retrieve image" and a
"reflect image" command sequence, or (3) the way of the "cyberpunk future," in which
a man with electrodes implanted under his skull, an implant that allows him to
perform mental reflections effortlessly, sits in front of a screen with an image and can
choose to use his implanted function or his natural function to rotate the image on the
screen.*  It is apparent to Clark and Chalmers and to this writer as well that (3) is
philosophically no different from (1).  On what grounds, then, can (2) be considered
different?  Not on the grounds that it is not all in the head, because that is the
question at issue.  Yet what else is there to distinguish (2) from the likes of (3)?  If in
both (1) and (3) the mind accomplishes the mental task, what is the "mind" in (2)?
The answer, say Clark and Chalmers, is "the extended mind" which consists of the
"coupled system" of man and machine.  A simple and beautiful insight, but one never
advanced before in the literature.
Now we cannot here recount all the potential considerations against this view ably
rebuffed by Clark and Chalmers, nor can we retrace in the space available to us their
many Gedanken experiments in support of their position, although we do ask the
skeptical reader to hold his fire until reading their intricate defense of their position.
What we can and will do here, however, is relate their main conclusions from all the
argumentation over the fine print as to what is and what is not necessary for an
external component of a coupled mental system to be properly so-called.
First, the coupling must be reliable, so that access to the external component can be
assumed, if not always, then just as often and as reliably and as reasonably as we
have access to internal mental mechanisms.  Second, what is not of concern is how
the access is gained, e.g. whether by introspection or perception.
From this, Clark and Chalmers conclude that beliefs are also not in the head—but in
the mind, and, in particular, in the extended mind.  They set forth four conditions for
beliefs: (1) the external component which has the information ascribed to the belief
must be such that the person will rarely act on a matter relevant to the belief without
first making use of the external component; (2) the information must be readily
available; (3) upon retrieving the information, the person automatically endorses it as
his belief; and (4) the information has been so endorsed by the person in the past
and is there as a consequence of that endorsement.
Now these are not trivial conditions; on any view which does not reject outright the
concept of the extended mind, they are quite restrictive.  We have no wish to loosen
the conditions, only to extend what qualifies as information sufficient to form a belief
from declarative knowledge to procedural knowledge, in the AI tradition. [3]  Thus, I
am prepared to say that I have a belief about the time of day—all day, every day,
about the sum of any two large 7-digit numbers, about what libraries held my latest
book as of yesterday, about what indexing and abstracting services picked up last
quarter's column, and about what rulings were handed down by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York last week.  
On the face of it, of course, these seem like preposterous claims of knowledge, but
if one accepts the procedural view of knowledge—that having an algorithm to obtain
the knowledge is a form of the knowledge, then all we need are external components
that can be reliably accessed (a watch, a calculator or the Windows calculator, the
BIB database of the Research Libraries Group (RLG) and the WorldCat database of
the Online Computer Library Center (OCLC), the indexing and abstracting services
available online through OCLC, ISI, the AMS, and numerous other sources, and the
Lexis database on the Web).  
I will almost always consult my watch, calculator, or these databases if asked to act
on my beliefs in these matters (for example, by answering a simple query as to what
they are!): condition (1) met.  I have—Internet blackouts aside—ready access to all
these external components: condition (2) met.  I would fall for a failing watch, a
flawed Pentium chip, or an error in a database as reliable as the above—I do in fact
endorse the information that comes ex machina pretty automatically, not noticeably
less, at any rate, than information that comes from my "own" memory—and perhaps
more: condition (3) met.
Condition (4) seems to be the problematic one, but if we bear in mind that it is the
procedure that genuinely comprises the belief, the procedure in each case has been
consciously endorsed before and the belief about the procedure is there because of
its prior endorsement.  Of course, as Clark and Chalmers briefly suggest might be
true for the declarative case and is surely true for the procedural extension we
propose, the fine print of the position involves getting to a coherent and
correspondent (i.e., internally and externally consistent) account of meeting the fourth
condition.
Although we do not provide such an account here, we have sketched out a theory
that explains why someone who uses the Internet daily (and particularly the Web as
a gateway to intranets) would feel that he was losing his mind, that his beliefs were
slipping away, when his Internet access is cut off.  How exactly do we feel?  The
same way we feel the day we forget our watch at home or (if we are under 35) cannot
find a calculator when we have need of arithmetic.  Perhaps the Silicon Valley
Sentinel-Observer will report on a case that may yet come before the Supreme Court:
Is twice being in jeopardy of loss of Internet access twice being in jeopardy of loss
of limb?
References
[1] Andy Clark and David Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," Analysis 58(January
1998): 7-19.
[2] Robert Fox, "Chip off the Old Gray Block," News Track, Communications of the
ACM 41(January 1998): (1)9.
[3] An extensive dialogue between the declarative and procedural views of
knowledge can be found in the first and best edition of Patrick Henry Winston's
classic work, Artificial Intelligence (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1977), pp.
390-392.  (For a review of some of the defects of the third edition see my "PC in
Computer Science?" Measure 113(February 1993): 5-6.)


"The Extended Mind"--Extended

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