Rushing to Overpay: The REIT Premium Revisited

Abstract

We explore the questions of whether and why Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) pay more for real estate than non-REIT buyers, consequently breaking the law of one price. We develop a model where REITs optimally pay more for property because (1) they are able, due to capital access advantages and, (2) are occasionally compelled, due to regulatory time constraints on the deployment of capital. We show that the typically large (20 to 60 percent) and statistically significant (p-values less than 0.01) REIT-buyer premiums found in standard empirical hedonic pricing models are biased due to unobserved explanatory variables. Using a repeat-transaction methodology that controls for unobserved independent variables, we find the REIT-buyer premium to be about 5 percent. Furthermore, we show that REITs¿ ability (as measured by access to capital markets) and regulator compulsion (as measured by capital deployment deadlines) are related to the price premium.Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), commercial properties, hedonic price analysis, repeat transactions, market efficiency, law of one price, price premium