Crémer, Jacques

Khalil, Fahad

English

Research Papers in Economics

A Model of Selective Tendering: Does Bidding Competition Deter Opportunism by Contractor?”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and

A partial tour around an idiosyncratic selection of models related to the interaction of ﬁrm and individual reputations,&quot; mimeo,

A Super-game Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars during Booms”,

A Theory of Incentives

Auctioning Entry into Tournaments&quot;,

Auctions Versus Negotiations&quot;,

Bid Rotation and Collusion in Repeated Auctions&quot;,

Competition and the Incentive to Produce High Quality&quot;,

Contracting on time&quot;, forthcoming American Economic Review.

Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evalutions&quot;,

Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments&quot;,

Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure,

Imperfect Competition and Commitment&quot;

Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and the Involuntary Unemployment&quot;,

Incentive Versus Transaction Costs: a Theory of Procurement Contracts”,

Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity&quot;,

Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?&quot;,

L’aﬃdamento mediante gara di contratti pubblici: l’importanza della reputazione&quot; (with English summary),

Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions”, mimeo

Motivation and Markets&quot;,

Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”,

On the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts&quot;, Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,

Optimal Design of Research Contests&quot;,

Optimal Incentives for Teams&quot;,

Optimal Procurement Mechanisms&quot;,

Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence,”

Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns on Reputation&quot;,

Relational Contracts and Property Rights&quot;,

Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions&quot;,

Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”,

Relational Incentive Contracts&quot;,

Relational Team Incentives and Ownership”,

Reputation and Imperfect Information,”

Reputation and Product Quality&quot;,

Reputation and The Allocation of Ownership”,

Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts”,

The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts&quot;,

The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency&quot;,

The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance&quot;,

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract

http://idei.fr/doc/conf/veol/gspagnolo.pdf

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract

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Research Papers in Economics