Uma Avaliação da Política de Combate à Informalidade da Mão-de-Obra, Aplicando Teoria dos Jogos

Abstract

The policy to combat informal labour, implemented by Labour Inspectorate Units (Fiscalização do Trabalho) until December 2002, did not result in a reduction in the informal sector indicators provided by IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Research) for the Brazilian labour market. This raises a question: why has the work carried out by Labour Inspectorate Units did not result in a reduction in the informal sector figures if the number of workers formally registered during inspections significantly increased in the period from 1999 to 2002? The present study is based on the assumption that there were flaws in the model and procedures followed by Labour Inspectorate Units to combat informality in the labour market, which counteracted the positive outcome that the increase in formality resulting from inspection activities should have generated in the labour market.Combating Informality, Labour Inspection Procedures, Fine Charging Effectiveness