Politiker, Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, Funktionäre, Politisches System, Politicians, European Economic and Monetary Union, Officials, Political system

Ben Crum

English

Research Papers in Economics

CESifo Forum 4/2002 19
Pro and Contra
YES
BEN CRUM*
A debate has recently started about the future of
the presidency of the European Union. In turn, the
prime ministers of France, the UK, Spain, Italy and
Sweden have argued that the current system of the
rotating presidency should be replaced by a full-
time president. Clearly the rotating presidency is
running out of steam. As if governing one’s own
country is not enough, the presiding government is
expected to fulfil ever more duties. Some govern-
ments are better able to handle the presidency
than others. Moreover, after enlargement, each
member state will only come to hold the presiden-
cy once every 12 or more years.
While the proposal for a full-time president will
remove the problems of the rotating presidency, it
will create others as it institutionalises a second
system of executive power in Brussels. So far the
European Commission has been the most perma-
nent embodiment of the Union, but its executive
powers are limited in important respects. Most
strikingly, executive power in key policies, such as
foreign policy and security, has been kept under
the firm control of the Council and its own secre-
tariat.
With a full-time president, the Council secretariat
is likely to develop into a parallel administration.
This will create serious coordination problems, if
not outright conflict, between the two administra-
tions. More fundamentally, the presence of two
administrations is bound to further reduce the
credibility of the Union in the eyes of the public.
To prevent this situation, the obvious solution is to
fuse the two administrations and to have this
fusion embodied by the Union President with ‘a
double hat’: chairing the European Council as well
as the College of Commissioners. The advantages
of this reform are manifold. First of all, it would
restore a relationship of trust between the Council
and the Commission. It would clarify the adminis-
trative organisation of the Union, as well as facili-
tate the integration and simplification of executive
procedures. It would also preclude the develop-
ment of the Council secretariat into a second
European administration and optimise the use of
Union resources.
This radical proposal is bound to provoke a number
of objections. For a start, one may wonder whether
an EU President with two hats would not distort the
precious institutional balance of the Union.
However, this risk can be avoided by subjecting the
President’s powers to checks and balances, some of
which can already be discerned in the present sys-
tem. The European Treaties provide a stringent
delineation of the Union’s powers. Further, the
President’s powers would be bound by the European
legislator consisting of the Council and the
European Parliament. Following Montesquieu, the
key here is to ensure that the institutions remain
politically separate and that none of them will ever
be able to control the decisions taken by the other.
Would not an EU President distort the role of the
Commissioner as the impartial guardian of the
European interest? The classical image of the
Commission as a technocratic,impartial broker has
long been superseded by actual practice. As the
Commission has assumed ever more tasks, it has
also been obliged to take a political stance, but this
does not necessary imply that it has to relinquish
its role as guardian of the general European inter-
est. Moreover, to prevent the Commission from
developing into a party-political body, its other
members should still be nominated by the member
states (in collaboration with the President).
If you want to comment on this topic or react to the opinion expressed here, please visit the CESifo
Internet Forum on our web site: www.cesifo.de
SHOULD THE EU HAVE A
PRESIDENT WITH TWO HATS?
* Ben Crum is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. A working paper on
‘Effective and Accountable Leadership of the Union’ that he co-
authors with Wouter Coussens (Belgian Royal Institute for
International Relations) will be published early in 2003.Can an EU President be held democratically
accountable? Supposedly the EU President would
be a former head of state who has substantial expe-
rience in the European Council and can wield the
necessary authority inside and outside the Union.
Thus, naturally, the European Council should be
able to control the selection procedure. At the
same time, if the EU President will be at the head
of the Union’s executive powers, the nominee
would also need the support of a majority of the
European Parliament. Similar to the right of
approval it currently enjoys on the Commission
President, the Parliament should have a decisive
word on the Union President.
Thus, while the European Council would indicate
whom of its former members it would be willing to
accept as its President, the European party groups
could turn the choice of the President into a cen-
tral issue in the EP elections. Imagine the electoral
impact if in the next EP elections the two major
party groups in the European Parliament, the
Christian-Democrats and the Social Democrats,
were to adopt José Maria Aznar and Tony Blair as
their candidates for the EU Presidency. Indeed, a
President presiding over an integrated European
executive and accountable to both the European
Council and the European Parliament may be the
key to providing Europe with a credible democra-
tic face.
CESifo Forum 4/2002 20
Pro and Contra

Should the EU have a president with two hats? (Pro and contra) : yes

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Should the EU have a president with two hats? (Pro and contra) : yes

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