Wachstumspolitik, Reform, Politische Stabilität, EU-Recht, Growth policy, Political stability, Community law

Daniel Gros

English

Research Papers in Economics

CESifo Forum 4/2004 11
Pro and Contra
CONTRA:T HE COMMISSION
AND THE STABILITY PACT1
DANIEL GROS*
When large numbers of drivers ignore the speed
limit, it is good practice to reconsider its rationale
and, if reaffirmed, to tighten enforcement, especially
if the frequency of accidents increases. Hence, the
EU Commission was right in launching a debate
about the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which
has been violated by an increasing number of EMU
member countries. Unfortunately, however, the
Commission’s proposals for reform risk watering
down the Pact, resulting in an erosion of fiscal disci-
pline. In essence, the proposals by the Commission
give the impression that the disobedient drivers
might have a point and that drivers with better engi-
neered cars need not be held so strictly to the limit.
We are of the opposite opinion:The case to be made
for a consolidation of government finances against
the background of present and prospective demo-
graphic changes is actually stronger than ever
before.
The longer-term outlook for the European 
economy and SGP reform
The SGP was created in order to make the general
prohibition of “excessive” deficits in the Maastricht
Treaty operational.The Treaty, which introduced the
constraints on fiscal policy, started from the assump-
tion that nominal GDP would grow at 5 percent per
year on trend and that a debt ratio of 60 percent of
GDP was bearable. Consistent with these assump-
tions, it stipulated that government budget deficits
must not exceed 3 percent of GDP.
In hindsight, this deficit limit appears rather gener-
ous. Real potential growth is probably now only
around 13/4 percent in Euroland, and the ECB’s
inflation target is less than 2 percent.A more realis-
tic assumption for Euroland nominal trend growth is
thus around 31/2 percent.To stabilise the debt ratio at
60 percent of GDP, the deficit would therefore have
to be capped at 2.1 percent. Moreover, the ageing of
the Euroland population raises government liabili-
ties not included in the debt ratio in the Maastricht
definition. Hence, to keep governments solvent, the
latter should decline over time, ensuring that total
government liabilities do not increase on trend over
the next half century. These facts are generally
accepted. However, neither they, nor their obvious
implication that the conditions in the SGP should be
tightened rather than loosened, are reflected in the
Commission’s Communication of 3 September 2004.
Surprisingly, the Commission seems also to have
ignored a key argument in favour of raising the
threshold for invoking exceptional circumstances.
With the potential growth rate having declined in
most euro area countries, it is much more likely that
countries will experience phases during which
growth is “low” by historical standards. Hence, when
potential growth is slowing, authorities need to con-
tinuously update their view about what is exception-
ally “sluggish” growth. For example, a growth rate of
1.5 percent would most likely be considered ‘slug-
gish’ by politicians when compared to the goal of
3 percent as agreed at the Lisbon summit. However,
growth of 1.5 percent might already be very close to
(and for some countries above) potential growth in
reality, and should thus not constitute an excuse to
delay fiscal consolidation because of “sluggish”
growth.
1 Based on CEPS Policy Brief No. 58. * Daniel Gros, Director, CEPS.

Contra: The Commission and the Stability Pact

http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/ZS/ZS-CESifo_Forum/zs-for-2004/zs-for-2004-4/forum4-04-kap1-gros.pdf

Contra: The Commission and the Stability Pact

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