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Starting Small in Free Trade Agreements
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the structure of cooperation between two large countries under one-sided incomplete information. Foreign government privately observes its likelihood of experiencing a political economy shock in each period. Home governmentβs prior belief about this likelihood is updated in a Bayesian fashion as the relationship continues. We show that the home government employs its privilege to design a contract so as to start with a few-goods-agreement, and increase the extent of cooperation gradually as its belief is favorably updated through periods. We also provide the conditions under which the home government makes the partner reveal its type in the beginning, or enables it to stay in a cooperative relationship without a complete revelation. As opposed to conventional approaches that relate gradualism with cost of liberalization, we show that asymmetric information provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to emerge.Gradualism, Free Trade Agreements, Asymmetric Information