Advanced information on the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2005.Game Theory;

Committee, Nobel Prize

English

Research Papers in Economics

(1994a): “The nature of salience: An experimental investigation of pure coordination games”,

(1994b): “Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation”,

A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic,”

A deﬁnition of subjective probability”,

A formal information concept for games with incomplete information”,

A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames”,

A theory of disagreement in bargaining,”

Acceptable points in general cooperative q-person games”,

Agreeing to disagree”,

An essay on bargaining”,

An interview with Robert Aumann”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, forthcoming.

Arms and Inﬂuence,

Behavioral Game Theory,

Belief-free equilibria in repeated games”,

Choice and Consequence,

Conﬂict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises,P r i n c e t o nU n i v e r s i t y

Convention,

Cooperation and bounded recall”,

Cooperation in repeated games when the number of stages is not commonly known”,

Coordination, commitment, and enforcement”,

Correlated equilibrium as an extension of Bayesian rationality”,

Distinguished fellow: Reﬂections on Thomas Schelling”,

drugs: The cigarette experience”,

Dynamic models of segregation”,

Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project”,

Eciency and observability with long-run and short-run players”,

Entry, investment, and oligopolistic pricing”,

Epistemic condition for Nash equilibrium”,

Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion”,

Equilibrium in supergames”, Center for Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Hebrew University. (First part reprinted

Equilibrium points in n-person games”,

Ethics, law, and the exercise of self-command”,

Evolution and the Theory of Games,

Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders”,

Exploding the power keg myth: Preemptive wars almost never happen”,

Finitely repeated games”,

Folk Theorem for repeated games:

Game theoretic aspects of gradual disarmament”, “Repeated games with incomplete information: A survey of recent results”, and “Repeated games of incomplete information, the zero-sum extensive case”, Reports ST-80, 116 and 143, Mathematica Inc.,

Game Theory,

Game Theory: Analysis of Conﬂict,H a r v a r dU n i v e r s i t y Press,

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,

Gradualism and irreversibility”,

H o b b e s

Information, trade and common knowledge,”

Introduction to repeated games with imperfect monitoring”,

Joint projects without commitment”,

Long-term competition: A game-theoretic analysis”, mimeo. Hebrew University. (Reprinted

Markets with a continuum of traders”,

Maschler (with the collaboration of R. Stearns)

Micromotives and Macrobehavior,H a r v a r dU n i v e r s i t y Press,

Monotone games with positive spillovers,”

Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization”,

Non-cooperative games”,

Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information”,

On modes of economic governance”,

On second-best national savings and gametheoretic growth”,

On the Nash bargaining solution with noise”,

On the theory of inﬁnitely repeated games with discounting”,

Power and public goods”,

Power and taxes”,

Rational cooperation in the ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma”,

Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection”,

Rationalizable strategic behavior,”

Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games”,

Repeated games of incomplete information: an approach to the non-zero sum case”,

Self-command in practice, in policy, and in a theory of rational choice”,

Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2004): “Arms races and negotiations”,

Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetr¨ agheit - Teil I: Bestimmung des dynamischen Preisgleichgewichts”, Zeitschrift f¨ ur die gesamte

Strategy and Arms Control,T w e n t i e t h Century Fund,

Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”,

Survey of repeated games”,

The bargaining problem”,

The delicate balance of terror”,

The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books,

The evolution of focal points”,

The Folk theorem for repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information”,

The Folk theorem with imperfect public information”,

The Foundations of Statistics,

The intimate contest for self-command”,

The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target”,

The role of investment in entry deterrence”,

The role of multinational institutions in international trade cooperation”,

The Strategy of Conﬂict,

The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,

Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge

Towards a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring”,

Two-person cooperative games”,

Value of Non-Atomic Games,P r i n c e t o n

Voting for public goods”,

What is game theory trying to accomplish?”

What is game theory?”

Robert Aumann's and Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2005/advanced-economicsciences2005.pdf

Robert Aumann's and Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation

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