A number of technology products display positive network effects, and are used in
variable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include operating systems, infrastructure
and back-end software, web services and networking equipment. This paper studies optimal
nonlinear pricing for such products, under incomplete information, and with the threat of competitive
entry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects are modeled. Conditions under
which a fulfilled-expectations contract exists and is unique are established. While network effects
generally raise price, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend on the nature
of the network effects - in some cases, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes in usage
across customers, while in others cases, network effects raise the usage of all market participants.
Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also involve
a nonlinear two-part tariff. These results highlight the impact of network effects on trade-offs
between price discrimination and value creation, and have important managerial implications for
pricing policy in technology markets.
The need to deter competitive entry generally lowers profits for the monopolist, and increases
customer surplus. When network effects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry-deterring
monopoly contract is a fixed fee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However,
when the magnitude of heterogeneous network effects is relatively high, there are no changes in
total surplus induced by the entry threat, and the price changes merely cause a transfer of value
from the seller to its customers. The presence of network effects, and of a credible entry threat, are
also shown to increase distributional efficiency by reducing the disparity in relative value captured
by different customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these results are discussed.Information Systems Working Papers Serie