A patent holder owning a two-period lasting innovation is unable to push it into the market, so it is licensed to a downstream user with production capabilities to market it. The production cost of this firm can be low or high, but the patent holder has only a prior on this factLicensing, asymmetric information, screening, signaling

Manel Antelo

English

Research Papers in Economics

Fee versus royalty reconsidered,

Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent,

General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation,

How to license intangible property,

Licensing in the chemical industry.

On the licensing of innovations,

Optimal licensing of costreducing innovation,

Royalties vs. fees: how do firms pay for foreign technology,

Technology transfer under asymmetric information,

Technology transfer with moral hazard,

The dominance of fee licensing contracts under asymmetric information and signaling. CentrA, working paper E2009/08.

The licensing of patents under asymmetric information.

The private value of a patent: a game theoretic analysis,

The role of fixed fee and royalty in patent licensing,

The structure of licensing contracts,

The structure of payments as a way to alleviate contractual hazards in international technology licensing, mimeo,

Screening vs. signaling in technology licensing

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Screening vs. signaling in technology licensing

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Research Papers in Economics