Assuming that the issue of fragmentation of international human rights law can also be
usefully examined in the case-law on particular rights using a comparative method, this
article examines the divergence and convergence of freedom of assembly guarantees and
jurisprudence in international fora. It finds that some identified divergences in fact point
to underlying common concerns and assumptions about assemblies. On this basis, the
article argues that the fragmentation discourse is prone to structurally analogous, though
“reverse”, fallacies as the methodology of comparative law. In particular, the functionalist
method is much criticised for being apologetic or trapped within one’s own conceptual
and institutional system, a concern which might be present in the fragmentation debate as
well. The article concludes on this basis by formulating some suggestions which might be
applied to examining fragmentation in international human rights law and potentially
beyond.
Keywords: Assembly; Fragmentation; Expression; ICCPR; ECHR; Comparative Law;
Functionalis