International agricultural research is expanding beyond the development of annual crop technologies for individual farms to the development of longer-tern natural resource management techniques for entire landscapes. But technologies of practices with a long lag time between investment and returns are unlikely to be adopted by farmers unless they have secure rights to the underlying resources (property rights). Similarly, technologies that span multiple farms are unlikely to be adopted unless neighbors and groups work together (collective action). But little is know about the way property rights and collective action in developing countries mediate the adoption of technologies by farmers and groups. This statement offers suggestions for promoting sustainable natural resource management.

Knox, Anna, ed.

Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela, ed.

Place, Frank, ed.

Swallow, Brent, ed.

English

Research Papers in Economics

IFPRI
FOOD
POLICY
STATEMENT
NUMBER  39,  OCTOBER  2002
INTERNATIONAL
FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
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D
egradation of natural resources is a global problem that threatens the liveli-
hoods of millions of poor people. Innovation by research centers, develop-
ment organizations, and farmers themselves has produced many promising
technologies and practices for making agriculture and natural resource man-
agement more sustainable. Most of these technologies, however, require investment by
farmers, both individually on their own farms and collectively by groups or communi-
ties. The book, Innovation in Natural Resource Management: The Role of Property
Rights and Collective Action in Developing Countries, edited by Ruth Meinzen-Dick,
Anna Knox, Frank Place, and Brent Swallow, examines the factors that affect whether
and how farmers apply sustainable agricultural technologies and natural resource man-
agement practices, giving special attention to the role of property rights and collective action.
The volume begins with a conceptual framework showing how property rights
influence incentives to adopt innovations that have long time horizons, and how collec-
tive action is necessary for technologies or practices that operate on a socio-spatial
scale above the individual farm. A chapter on methodology discusses how the concepts
of tenure security and technology adoption can be put in practice in empirical studies
that are relevant to policymakers and practitioners. Case studies from Africa, Asia, and
Latin America then show the complex ways in which these institutions affect the adop-
tion of a wide range of practices, from agroforestry techniques to rangeland manage-
ment and from livestock feeding practices to integrated pest management.
Property Rights and Long-term Investment
Although the effects of property rights on agricultural investment have long been
debated, the evidence has been fragmented, owing in part to the poorly understood
complexities of the rights of individuals and groups to land, water, and trees.
Understanding the links between property rights and innovation requires looking
beyond "ownership" as defined by government title. For private, common, or public
property, there can be many different bundles of rights to use, manage, or transfer the
resource to others. The household may not always be the relevant level to examine
property rights: in Malawi, different rights held by men and women affect incentives
for forestry and agroforestry, whereas in Syria, rights of tribal communities play a key
role in rangeland management. 
Tenure security￿the extent of people’s rights and how confident they are that their
rights will be respected over time￿affects people’s long-term investments in technologies
for managing their resources. The case studies in the book describe different tenure systems
and examine their effects on investment and productivity. Evidence shows how tenure
arrangements can be shaped by market forces (as in cattle feed access in coastal Kenya) and
proximity to urban areas (as in land inheritance patterns in Malawi). Because tenure sys-
tems are dynamic they usually respond to population and commercialization forces to
accommodate new technology that is beneficial to the community. Not all members of the
community, however, will benefit equally. Where men of certain groups have primary
rights, women and tenants who have weaker, derived rights may not benefit as much and
may have different incentives. Tenure implications may also be embedded in the technolo-
gy itself, as is the case where cashew nut trees are used as evidence for land tenure in
Mozambique, and this situation may actually deter new investment. Finally, government
INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT: 
THE ROLE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
EDITED BY RUTH MEINZEN-DICK, ANNA KNOX, FRANK PLACE, 
AND BRENT SWALLOWintervention in tenure policy may have
positive or negative impacts on tenure
security.
Property rights do not derive
from state law alone; customary law
and even local norms may be even
more important sources. But if local
institutions erode, customary proper-
ty rights may also weaken. Indeed,
cases from Haiti and Syria argue that
state regulations formalizing tenure
have reduced tenure security by
weakening the social institutions that
underpinned customary property
rights systems, without replacing
them with effective state institutions.
In Ethiopia, state institutions were
"effective" but only in enforcing poli-
cies that restricted individual and
community rights.
Collective Action for Landscape-
level Innovation
Many natural resource management
practices cannot be effective if adopt-
ed by a single farmer but require
coordination across farms or even
communities. The cases of ant con-
trol in Colombia and cattle treatment
for tsetse fly control in Ethiopia
demonstrate the need for collective
action in pest management, as well as
some of the practical difficulties in
getting people to work together, even
where there is a clear common good.
The case of crop-livestock conflicts
in Sri Lanka shows that achieving
balanced resource management is
even harder where different user
groups are highly fragmented and
have conflicting interests. 
Like property rights, collective
action is dynamic, changing in
response to internal and external
forces, including policies, projects,
and the availability of innovations. In
Syria, for example, some customary
tribal institutions are effective in reg-
ulating rangelands, whereas others
have eroded. In Kenya, the availabili-
ty of new technologies for intensify-
ing cattle feeding has led to farmer
innovation in the institutions govern-
ing fodder access, as well as in the
application of the technologies them-
selves. The results of participatory
research on ant control in Colombia
and tsetse control in Ethiopia were
shaped by collective action, which in
turn depended upon the pre-existing
cohesiveness of the communities and
the practical difficulties and transac-
tion costs of cooperating. On the
other hand, a study from Honduras
found that although external govern-
ment organizations stimulate individ-
ual farmers to adopt conservation
practices, they appear to displace
local collective action for natural
resource management. 
The importance of collective
action goes beyond adoption of par-
ticular agricultural technologies.
Policies devolving the management of
irrigation systems, forests, fisheries,
and watershed resources from the
state to user groups are based on the
assumption that local communities
will act together to control resource
use. If that cooperation does not
materialize, then devolution will not 
lead to sustainable management. The
cases in this book are instructive
because they analyze factors affecting
the degree and type of collective
action that emerges or takes place.
Factors that can limit cooperation
include ethnic heterogeneity, power
differences, distance between farmers
or to market, and rapid population
growth or changes. Special attention
may be required under these condi-
tions. 
Conclusions
Simplistic policy prescriptions that
call for giving title as a way to stimu-
late investment can be misleading,
because there is more to tenure secu-
rity than just statutory title and more
factors influencing investment than
just tenure security. Development
practitioners also increasingly recog-
nize the need for collective action for
adoption of many technologies and
natural resource management prac-
tices, but sustained local involvement
requires more than just establishing
organizations on paper. Promoting
sustainable natural resource manage-
ment requires an understanding of the
interaction between local and external
institutions and must build on local
strengths. This volume provides both
methodological tools and empirical
findings to show how such an under-
standing can be developed and how it
can serve as the basis for adoption of
sustainable resource management
technologies to improve productivity,
equity, and the environment.
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