Failure detection and isolation investigation for strapdown skew redundant tetrad laser gyro inertial sensor arrays

Abstract

The degree to which flight-critical failures in a strapdown laser gyro tetrad sensor assembly can be isolated in short-haul aircraft after a failure occurrence has been detected by the skewed sensor failure-detection voting logic is investigated along with the degree to which a failure in the tetrad computer can be detected and isolated at the computer level, assuming a dual-redundant computer configuration. The tetrad system was mechanized with two two-axis inertial navigation channels (INCs), each containing two gyro/accelerometer axes, computer, control circuitry, and input/output circuitry. Gyro/accelerometer data is crossfed between the two INCs to enable each computer to independently perform the navigation task. Computer calculations are synchronized between the computers so that calculated quantities are identical and may be compared. Fail-safe performance (identification of the first failure) is accomplished with a probability approaching 100 percent of the time, while fail-operational performance (identification and isolation of the first failure) is achieved 93 to 96 percent of the time