Procreation, migration and tradable quotas

Abstract

First, we briefly discuss the very idea of tradable quotas, looking at a set of cases in which it has been proposed (but not implemented)outside the realm of pollution control of natural resources management. Next we study a proposal of tradable procreation quotas. We generalize Boulding’s 1964 idea and discuss a full scheme able to deal both with under and over procreation. We then look more specifically at three effets of the scheme on income inequalities : differential productivity effect, differential fertility effect and tradability effect. Finally, we consider the migration dimension and discuss two possible schemes : (1) a domestic scheme of tradable emigration quotas among skilled people, serving as a possible alternative to a Baghwati tax (with different properties); (2) a regional or global scheme of tradable immigration quotas of unskilled workers in rich countries, serving as a “burden sharing” mechanism. Special attention is given to some conjectures regarding the impact on education and average income back in the (poor) countries of origin.Bhagwati tax, Emission permits, Distributive effect, Overpopulation, Brain drain, Boulding