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A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games
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Abstract
We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the ?-game, we develop an extension called an ?-game. Finally, we compare equilibria in the ?- and ?-game with those in the ?- and ?-game of Hart and Kurz (1983).Core-stability, non-cooperative game theory, positive externality games