University of Calgary Centre for Military and Strategic Studies
Abstract
This article offers a new interpretation of French policy at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Based on a close reading of the archival record generated by the government of Georges Clemenceau, it argues that the bases of French policy at the Conference have been misunderstood. For the past century the majority of scholars writing about this period have accepted the standard interpretation that premier Clemenceau and his advisors were committed practitioners of Realpolitik who aimed above all at the destruction of German power. The 'realism' of the French post-war vision is typically placed in opposition to the more idealistic post-war visions of the British and especially the American delegations. This essay rejects this standard view. It argues instead that the Clemenceau government's peace programme was based on a Transatlantic vision of post-war order. This vision was based on a fascinating combination of presumed ideological affinities and common common economic and strategic interests
