Innovation and Environmental Policy: Clean vs. Dirty Technical Change

Abstract

We study a two sector endogenous growth model with environmental quality with two goods and two factors of production, one clean and one dirty. Technological change creates clean or dirty innovations. We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum and study first- and second-best policies. Optimal policy encourages research toward clean technologies. In a second-best world, we claim that a portfolio that includes a tax on the polluting good combined with optimal innovation subsidy policies is less costly than increasing the price of the polluting good alone. Moreover, a discriminating innovation subsidy policy is preferable to a non-discriminating one. JEL codes: H23, O3, O41Pollution, Endogenous Growth, Innovation, Environmental Policy, Laissez-Faire Equilibrium, Optimal Equilibrium, Discriminating vs. Non-Discriminating Subsidies to R&D