This entry for the forthcoming The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Second Edition) surveys the economic analysis of five primary fields of law: property law; liability for accidents; contract law; litigation; and public enforcement and criminal law. It also briefly considers some criticisms of the economic analysis of law.law and economics, property law, liability for accidents, contract law, litigation, public enforcement, criminal law

A. Mitchell Polinsky

Steven Shavell

English

Research Papers in Economics

A behavioral approach to law and economics.

A model of optimal incapacitation. American Economic Review: Papers and

A note on efficiency vs. distributional equity in legal rulemaking: should distributional equity matter given optimal income taxation? American Economic Review: Papers and

A Theory of Property Rights with Application to the California Gold Rush.

Acquisition and disclosure of information prior to sale.

An economic analysis of legal transitions.

An economic theory of the criminal law.

An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract, I: steady states.

An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in: The Utilitarians,

Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle.

Appealing judgments.

Contract Theory.

Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform. New York:

Corruption and optimal law enforcement.

Crime and punishment: an economic approach.

Criminal law and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent.

Damage measures for breach of contract.

Economic Analysis of Accident Law.

Economic Analysis of Law.

Efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract.

Fairness versus Welfare.

Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of default rules.

Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law.

Incomplete contracts and renegotiation.

Incomplete contracts. The New Palgrave Dictionary

Judicial auditing.

Judicial competence and the interpretation of incomplete contracts.

Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers.

Litigation and settlement under imperfect information.

Litigation and settlement under two-sided incomplete information.

Mistake, disclosure, information, and the law of contracts.

Monitoring vis-à-vis investigation in enforcement of law.

Offer, acceptance, and efficient reliance.

On liability and insurance.

On the writing and interpretation of contracts.

Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior.

Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error.

Plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion,

Pre-contractual reliance.

Private versus public enforcement of fines.

Property rights in economic history: implications for research.

Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of the cathedral.

Relational contracts in the courts: an analysis of incomplete agreements and judicial strategies.

Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement.

Risk sharing through breach of contract remedies.

Settlement of litigation.

Settlement, litigation, and the allocation of litigation costs.

Sharing of information prior to settlement or litigation.

Single activity accidents.

Specific versus general enforcement of law.

Strict liability versus negligence.

The appeals process as a means of error correction.

The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis. New Haven:

The dynamics of pretrial negotiation.

The Economic Structure of Tort Law.

The economic theory of public enforcement of law.

The fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive to use the legal system.

The optimal structure of law enforcement.

The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines.

The optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent.

The private enforcement of law.

The problem of social cost.

The selection of disputes for litigation.

The social versus the private incentive to bring suit in a costly legal system.

The strategic structure of offer and acceptance: game theory and the law of contract formation.

The taking of land: when should compensation be paid?

The value of accuracy in adjudication: an economic analysis.

Toward a theory of property rights.

Toward an economic theory of liability.

Trademark law: an economic perspective.

When should an offer stick? The economics of promissory estoppel in preliminary negotiations.

Who should bear the costs of failed negotiations? A functional inquiry into precontractual liability.

Why the legal system is less efficient than the income tax in redistributing income.

Economic Analysis of Law

http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/05-005.pdf

Economic Analysis of Law

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Research Papers in Economics