Water allocation, Irrigation programs, Reservoirs, Participatory management, Farmer participation, Water rights, Irrigated farming, Rice, Water shortage, Farmers' attitudes, Farmer-agency interactions, Sri Lanka

Brewer, J. D.

Sakthivadivel, R.

Somaratne, P. G.

English

Research Papers in Economics

0.3 ha. Rehabilitated schemes have standardized 
sizes of 0.3 ha, 0.5 or 0.7 ha. 
The layout and shape of plots and fields in the 
traditional schemes are irregular. Individual plots 
are usually not contiguous because fields are not 
consolidated as in rehabilitated schemes. 
Irrigation  Organizations 
Smallholder schemes have what are known as tra­
ditional irrigation organizations. These are found 
in all schemes under various names like Uongozi 
wa Mfereji  (Canal Leadership),  Kamati  ya Mfereji 
(Canal Committee) or Wazee wa Mfongo (Canal El­
ders). Some of these organizatiOns were registered 
as cooperative societies. 
Since the 19805,  the rehabilitation of traditional 
schemes and the construction of water harvesting 
schemes have taken a new direction with regard 
to farmers' organizations. 
New organizations of water users are being estab­
lished. These include Water Users' Associations 
(WUAs)  or Water Users' Cooperatives (WUCs) .. 
This is a result of imitating the successful experi­
ments with such types of organizations in Asian 
countries. 
Credit Schemes 
There are no credit arrangements in irrigation 
schemes. Fanners depend on local moneylenders 
as sources of credit. This is the case in almost all 
the schemes. 
The government has started to propagate the idea 
of establishing credit schemes in order to assist 
smallholder farmers in their irrigation needs. This 
is part of the introduction of the cost-recovery / 
cost-sharing mechanisms for  all costs whether 
they are loans or grants from development agen­
cies and banks. Farmers are being educated on the 
fact that irrigation development is a long-term 
economic investment and that it has a lasting 
value. 
An irrigation management system is being intro­
duced to ensure that irrigation schemes are man­
aged by the farmers themselves. Farmers are 
mostly involved in water management and to a 
lesser extent in scheme management. The approach 
is towards unifying these roles so that efficiency of 
schemes is achieved. Through such efficiency 
achievements, the profitability of irrigated agricul­
ture could be acknowledged by the farmers. 
Condusion 
On the basis of the above discussion, it is obvious 
that there is a  great need to transform the 
smallholder irrigation farmers into technologically 
viable communities. This could be done through: 
promotion of animal traction, assemblage of trac­
tors and stationing them in schemes through trac­
tor hire services, promotion of WUAs/WUCs, es­
tablishment of rural agricultural banks, institu­
tionalization of equity in land allocation practices 
whether by gender or individual basis and the 
construction of intermediate technology for food 
storage and processing facilities. 
[MWIlJIihl KagvbiIo,  Notional Sociologist,  InsIiMionol Supp/Kt frI/rrigotion DeveIo(ment, 
Ministly at A(JIiQlhurB,  P.O.  Box 3308, Oar es SoIaam,  Tanzonia.] 
The  Political  Dimension of Seasonal  Allocations:  Developing a Seasonal 

Allocation  Strategy in aWater-Short System  in  Sri  lanka 

The Kirindi Oya System in southeastern Sri Lanka  Water availability was badly overestimated dur­
commands an area of 23,000 acres and is fed from  ing the planning of the Kirindi Oya System. The 
the Kirindi Oya River. The core of the system is  initial appraisal estimated the average annual in­
the Ellegala Irrigation System, a very old irrigated  flow to Lunuganvehera Reservoir, upstream of the 
area centered on five fonnerly independent tanks  old Ellagala Irrigation System in the Kirindi Oya 
fed by a diversion from the Kirindi Oya.  Irrigation and Settlement Project, to be 318,000 
-37­acre-feet. In fact, the annual inflow has been sig­
nificantly less and the variability has been high. 
In addition, the planners figured that the farmers 
would be willing to plant less water-loving crops 
than rice in much of the command. In fact,  the 
farmers strongly prefer rice and have resisted 
other crops, further aggravating the water short­
age. Conflicts among the farmers over water were 
inevitable. From 1986, when water was first issued 
for cultivation from the Lunuganvehera Reservoir, 
through 1991, seasonal allocations were handled 
largely by government officers. Seasonal alloca­
tions for Ellegala and the New Areas were dis­
cussed with farmers separately, but farmers had 
no voice in allocating water between Ellegala and 
the New Areas. 
Developing an  Improved Seasonal Allocation  Process: 1990-1993 
In 1990,  IIMI, which had been studying the 
Kirindi Oya System since 1986, prepared a report, 
catalyzing several government decisions. One key 
decision was to end construction early. A second 
was to improve seasonal allocation processes to 
use water more efficiently, to give New Area farm­
ers more opportunities to cultivate, and to encour­
age crop diversification. There were two key as­
pects to the efforts: 
Redefining the Decision-Making Authority. Until 
1991, seasonal allocation decisions were made by 
the government officers with only token involve­
ment of the farmers. However, Sri Lanka has 
adopted a  "participatory management policy" 
under which farmers are encouraged to form hy­
drologically based organizations which select 
farmer representatives. These farmer representa­
tives sit with officers from the relevant agencies 
on a  Project Management Committee (PMC) 
which is responsible for seasonal allocations. 
When participatory management was introduced 
to Kirindi Oya in 1986, separate PMCs were cre­
ated for Ellegala and the New Areas. Because 
these PMCs lacked the ability to decide allocations 
between the two parts of the system, they had 
little influence on seasonal allocations. In 1991, the 
two PMCs were combined into one which is now 
officially recognized as the legitimate decision­
making body for seasonal allocations. 
DeviSing PrinCiples for Assigning Seasonal Wa­
ter Rights. In Sri Lanka, all surface water legally 
belongs to the government; there are no legally 
recognized individual or group water rights. Sea­
sonal allocation decisions are subject to review 
and change by the government. The final author­
ity is the Minister in charge of irrigation. Alloca­
tions are normally based on certain widely ac­
cepted principles: 
Water is distributed to all farmers in authorized 
areas in proportion to landholdings subject to a 
level defined for particular crops. Thus rice ar­
eas receive more water than non-rice crop areas. 
Equity is to be sought among authorized farm­
ers. 
A standing crop has priority over a crop not yet 
planted. 
In addition, two local principles were recognized 
at Kirindi Oya: 
Ellegala farmers were recognized to have a pri­
ority claim to Kirindi Oya water on the grounds 
that they were using it first. 
Whenever water was available for the New 
Areas, system managers assigned it to different 
subareas in a crude rotation system intended to 
assure long-term equity. 
In 1991, a high-level government committee was 
charged with devising a fairer allocation policy. 
Their recommendation, issued in January 1992, 
suggested that parts of the system, including parts 
of Ellegala, be followed each season in rotation. 
In June 1992,  these recommendations were dis­
cussed with and rejected by farmer representa­
tives. These farmer representatives responded 
with a set of counterproposals aimed at making 
it possible to cultivate the whole of Kirindi Oya 
every season, mostly by planting non-rice crops 
and by improving water-use efficiency. 
Following this discussion, a local-level Technical 
Committee of officers from various agencies and 
llMI was created to tum the two sets of recom­
mendations into a workable plan. The Technical 
Committee first carried out a new analysis of in­
flow to the Lunuganvehera Reservoir and took 
note of other findings to establish a better techni­
cal basis of planning. On the basis of these analy­
ses, the Technical Committee proposed a compro­
mise under which the New Areas would receive 
water for non-rice crops in 40 percent of the area 
-38­and water for rice in 60 percent of the area dur­
ing malul (wet season from October through Feb­
ruary). The non-rice crop would be rotated among 
different portions of the New Areas. During yala 
(dry season from April through August) the area 
with non-rice crops in the preceding maha would 
receive water for a second non-rice crop while the 
remainder would not receive water. Ellegala 
would receive water for 95 percent cultivation of 
rice during maha; during yala, Ellegala would 
receive enough water for 85  percent rice and 15 
percent non-rice crops. 
Disaster in Yolo  1992 
Yala cultivation decisions are normally not made 
until mid-March and cultivation normally begins 
around mid-April. The Ellegala farmers were sus­
picious of the various efforts to modify the seasonal 
allocation system; they felt that it was meant to 
curtail their priority access to water. Therefore, at 
the January 1992 PMC meeting, Ellegala farmer 
representatives consistently requested authoriza­
tion of the whole of Ellegala for yala rice cultiva­
tion. 
Yala rains normally begin by late March. In 1992, 
rains did not begin in March; it was so dry that by 
the end of March, people all over Sri Lanka were 
beginning to speak of drought. A PMC meeting 
was held on 20 March to make the seasonal allo­
cations but the decision was postponed because the 
reservoir was low and rains had not started. Rains 
started in mid-April. Another PMC meeting was 
held on 24 April. Under pressure from the officers, 
the PMC decided to wait until more rains had 
fallen.  This decision led to a demonstration by a 
large group of Ellegala farmers demanding imme­
diate issues for the whole of Ellegala. As a result, 
a special PMC meeting was held on 1 May where, 
against the advice of the officers, the Ellegala 
farmer representatives demanded and got autho­
rization for rice cultivation for all of Ellegala. The 
officers, fearful of failure of the rains met with 
farmers in several areas to explain the risks.  Al­
though some farmers said later that they were per­
suaded that the risks were too high, their own rep­
resentatives pushed them to cultivate to maintain 
their priority rights to the water. 
As the season progressed, it became apparent that 
the worst predictions for the season would come 
true. Rains were lighter than usual and failed to­
tally in mid-June. Water issues from Lunugan­
vehera were stopped on 23 July to protect domes­
tic water supplies despite protests from Ellegala 
farmer representatives and from farmers through 
political channels. The result was total crop fail­
ure in most of Ellegala: about three-fourths of the 
yala 1992 crop was lost. 
Conflid and  Loss in  Moho 1992/93 
The Technical Committee presented its first set of 
recommendations for seasonal allocations to the 
Project Management Committee in July 1992. With 
slight modifications, these recommendations were 
accepted for maha 1992/93. The decision called 
for allocation of water for rice in only one-third 
of the New Areas. From August through October, 
opposition to the planned seasonal allocation 
grew, particularly in the Left Bank Tracts 1 and 2 
and Right Bank Tract 1 of the New Areas which, 
under the seasonal plan, were to grow non-rice 
crops. In  opposition to the plan, an "independent" 
farmers' organization was formed in these tracts 
with the support of a local government officer. 
Final decisions were delayed when rains came 
later than expected and the water level in the res­
ervoir rose slowly. Heavy rains finally arrived in 
mid-November. On 19 November, the PMC allo­
cated water for rice to Ellegala and to Right Bank 
Tracts 2 and 5.  All of the other New Area tracts 
were to receive water for non-rice crops only. 
Dissatisfaction with the decision led a local poli­
tician to appeal personally to the Minister in 
charge of irrigation, asking him to authorize wa­
ter for rice for Right Bank Tract 1 and Left Bank 
Tracts 1 and 2. On the Minister's orders, a special 
PMC meeting was convened on 22 November but 
because of opposition from others, the PMC did 
not change the allocation. With assistance from a 
Member of Parliament, a delegation of farmers 
from the "independent" farmer organization met 
the Minister in Colombo during the first week of 
December. The Minister agreed to authorize wa­
ter for rice to Right Bank Tract 1 and Left Bank 
Tracts 1 and 2 on 20 December subject to the con­
dition that all plowing be completed by that date 
using rainfall only. 
Very little plowing had been carried out by 20 
December. Government employees tried to deliver 
water only to the few fields where plowing had 
been completed, but they were harassed and 
-39­threatened by angry farmers. Water delivery to 
Ellegala was blocked by fanners to get more for 
the Left Bank tracts and farmers took over op­
eration of gates and regulators to take water. The 
situation was chaotic and the government had 
lost control of the system. To  resolve the situa­
tion, some farmer representatives and a senior ir­
rigation officer met the Minister again on 25 De­
cember when he authorized water issues for rice 
for all parts of the three tracts from 27 Decem­
ber. 
One consequence was the loss of at least 650 acres 
of non-rice crops that had been planted in the 
tracts according to the PMC decision; most of 
these crops were simply under-plowed. Many of 
the fanners are claiming compensation from the 
government. However, ultimately all of the rice 
crops in Kirindi Oya in maha continued into May, 
and it required the use of inflow from yala rain­
fall, nonnally reserved for the Ellegala fanners. In 
turn, this meant that only a  small portion of 
Ellegala could be authorized water for rice dur­
ing yala 1993. 
lessons learnt from  the Events 
The dramatic events of yala 1992 and maha i992/ 
93 made the basic conflicts and the disagreements 
among groups of farmers and between fanners 
and officers stand out clearly. Despite the losses, 
the events of the two seasons taught important 
lessons to the fanners, officers and politicians: 
Fanners learned more about the operation of the 
system; the Ellegala farmers, in particular, 
learned not to distrust the government officers 
as much as they did in yala 1992. 
From the maha events, all of the fanners learned 
that the New Area fanners will have the sup­
port of the government if they demand rights 
to water. The EUegala fanners threatened to go 
to court to establish their rights legally. 
The political interventions in maha 1992-93 gen­
erated a great deal of criticism by some fanners 
and by many officers. Some of the political au­
thorities are now supporting the establishment 
of a seasonal allocation strategy accepted by all 
of the fanners. 
During these seasons, each group of farmers 
tested the limits of its political power-exercised 
through the officers and politicians-against the 
other. Compromises became possible when each 
group learned the limits of its power to push its 
own interests. 
Condusion 
Because Kirindi Oya System is a water-short sys­
tem, the conflicting interests of the various 
groups of persons are more visible there than in 
systems with more water. This fact makes it pos­
sible to see clearly various key aspects of the pro­
cess of developing an effective seasonal alloca­
tion strategy. 
1. 	 First, although a seasonal allocation policy and 
strategy must have a sound technical and orga­
nization basis, its development is not only a 
technical process, but also a political process 
during which various interested groups, includ­
ing fanners, system managers, other govern­
ment officers and politicians have to come to 
acceptable compromises. 
2. 	 Second, when a conscious attempt is made to 
develop a more effective seasonal allocation 
strategy, it is necessary to plan for ways to draw 
groups with conflicting interests into the politi­
cal process hann1essly. 
3. 	 Third, when government agencies undertake the 
development of a seasonal allocation policy, it 
is necessary to put effort into getting agreement 
among the responsible officers from the various 
agencies and the politicians. 
The basic concern is to develop strong technical 
and organizational bases for seasonal allocations 
than to play out the political processes in a non­
destructive way. In systems more water-rich than 
the Kirindi Oya System, there is likely to be more 
leeway for nondestructive conflicts, but the prin­
ciples involved apply to all cases of improving 
seasonal allocation processes. 
[Jeffrey O.  Brewer,  SockJI Scientist;  K.  Saklhivadivel,  Senior JrrVgrioo Speda/isI; and P.G. 

Somaratne,  K6SefJfdI  Office~ uII at IIMI.J 
 • 
-40­

The political dimension of seasonal allocations: Developing a seasonal allocation strategy in a water-short system in Sri Lanka

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The political dimension of seasonal allocations: Developing a seasonal allocation strategy in a water-short system in Sri Lanka

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