U.S. military action in Panama: justifying OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Abstract

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-69).Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.The project of this thesis is a moral evaluation of OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the United States' use of military force in Panama in 1989. I begin by arguing that just war theory, both in its classic and contemporary forms, needs to be revised. Present just war positions do not adequately take into account the complex, nontraditional missions that military forces are increasingly called to perform in today's ever-changing international arena. From humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia to peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, militaries today and those of the United States in particular, are serving in roles that are a sharp tactical departure from those they prepared for in the Cold War era. OPERATION JUST CAUSE is one such example of these types of nonstandard missions. I survey classic and contemporary just war theories, select and modify appropriate criteria, and restate a modified composite theory that I argue for as optimal for evaluating these new types of military actions. I then put my composite theory to the test by examining in detail U.S. motives and actions in Panama in 1989, and subsequently evaluating them against my revised criteria. Finally, given the judgment methodology that I state, I conclude that OPERATION JUST CAUSE was a justified use of military force by the United States