我国是实行分权治理的国家,地方政府除了承担中央政府授予的计划生育、教育文化和社会稳定职能外,还被授予极大的经济管理权限。分权在中央与地方之间产生了委托代理关系,由于中央政府与地方政府之间目标的不一致以及信息不对称,中央政府要设计激励机制来规范地方政府官员的行为。本文从机制设计的角度,一方面考察了当政绩考核为单一的经济增长指标时,中央政府所采取的激励机制的结果;另一方面,分析了当政绩考核由单一的增长指标变为综合性指标,并且其中一些指标不易准确测量时,政府官员行为的激励扭曲。基于此,得出了地方政府官员激励机制设计的一些原则。China is a decentralized country,where the local governments have widespread economic decision power except for those functions as family planning,education,and social stability.Decentralization results in a principal-agent relationship between the central and local governments.With inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information,the central government needs to design motivation mechanism to regulate local bureaucrats.This article investigates the motivation outcomes where performance is evaluated only by economic growth,and the motivation problems for local bureaucrats where performance is evaluated by comprehensive indicators.We thus obtain some principles for the design of motivation mechanism.国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:70873099
