文章通过建立一个两企业博弈模型,分析了产业首创企业进入时机的选择机制。分析得出的主要结论是:(1)当后动优势占优时,企业进入时机的选择并不必然依赖于企业自身资源,产业首创者反而更可能是企业自身资源相对较弱者;(2)虽然产业发展潜力及预期利润对产业首创者的进入具有正向促进作用,但是该促进作用随后动优势的增加而减小。文章利用1998-2007年中国工业企业数据,对结论(1)进行了实证检验,并支持该结论。最后文章提出了产业产生时机的概念,并提出了相应的政策建议。Through the establishment of a two-firm game model,this paper analyzes the selection mechanism of entry timing of industry pioneers.It arrives at the conclusions as follows:firstly,when the second-mover advantage is dominant,the selection of entry timing in firms does not necessarily depend on their own resources,and industry pioneers are even more likely to be the firms with relatively less own resources;secondly,although industry development potential and expected profits play the positive role in promoting the entry of industry pioneers,the positive role weakens with the increase in the second-mover advantage.Using the data of industry enterprises in China from1998to 2007,this paper makes an empirical test of the first conclusion and provides the support for this conclusion.At last,it proposes the concept of industry generation timing and some corresponding policy recommendations.教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(12YJA790081); 国家社科基金青年项目(12CJL028
