Managerial Overconfidence,Tax Shield Kink and Corporate Performance

Abstract

随着行为公司金融的兴起,管理者非理性尤其是过度自信的认知偏差与公司财务决策关系的研究成为一个新的研究热点。基于中国制度背景,以2002年至2007年沪深两市A股上市公司为观测值,考察管理者过度自信、债务政策与公司绩效之间的关系。采用TOb IT和lOgISTIC回归模型,从管理者过度自信视角,利用税盾拐点考察公司的债务政策。实证检验结果发现,管理者过度自信显著影响公司的债务政策,公司税盾拐点随管理者过度自信程度的增强而降低,表明过度自信管理者将实施更为激进的债务融资策略。利用OlS回归模型检验过度自信管理者实施的债务政策与公司绩效之间的关系,发现公司绩效随债务税盾拐点的降低而下降,意味着如果过度自信管理者奉行的债务政策是激进的,将对公司绩效产生不利影响。With the emerging of behavioral corporate finance,the relationship between managerial irrational behavior,especially cognitive bias of overconfidence,and corporate financial decision becomes a new hot research issue.Based on the background of Chinese institution,the paper examined the relationship of managerial overconfidence,debt policy and corporate performance by sampling A-share listed firms from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period from the year 2002 to 2007.With the tobit and logistic regressions model,the paper used tax shield kink to examine corporate debt policy from the perspective of managerial overconfidence.The result shows that managerial overconfidence significantly affects corporate debt policy.The kink of tax shield decreases with the increasing of managers′ overconfidence,and indicates overconfident managers implement the more radical debt policy.Moreover,the paper tested the relationship between the debt policy with overconfident managers and corporate performance with the OLS regressions model.The results show that corporate performance reduces with the decreasing of tax shield kink.It means that the radical debt policy with overconfident managers produces negative influence on corporate performance.国家自然科学基金(70872096);福建省教育厅社会科学研究项目(JA10054S);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金(09SJB630038);南京审计学院校级一般课题(NSK2009/B13)---

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