【中文摘要】资产重组中大股东因未达成业绩承诺而采取的股票补偿方式有两种：定向回购补偿和股票赠送补偿。文章通过构建模型分析，并以濮耐股份（采用定向回购补偿方式）和四川双马（采用股票赠送补偿方式）为案例，比较研究了两种股票补偿方式的投资者保护效果。结果表明，股票赠送可直接增加流通中小股东的持股数量，中小股东从股票赠送补偿中获得的收益大于定向回购补偿，即股票赠送补偿方式更有利于保护中小股东的利益。
【Abstract】If large shareholders fail to meet performance requirements, they use either stock repurchase or stock reward to compensate minority share holders. This paper analyzes and compares the effect of the two types of compensation programs on investor protection by constructing an econometric model and a case study. We find that stock reward program is better than stock repurchase scheme in the sense that it can better protect the interests of minority shareholders. Our results suggest that the CSRC should make stock reward a priority in the two types of stock compensation programs so as to strengthen the protection of minority shareholders' interest.教育部人文社会科学基金项目“大股东资产注入行为及其经济后果研究”（11YJC790107)、中国博士后科学基金项目“资产注入中大股东业绩承诺与中小股东权益保护研究”（2013M531432)、江苏省博士后科研资助计划项目“资产注入中大股东承诺与中小股东权益保护研究”（1202081C)及中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金“大股东注入资产盈利承诺与中小股东权益保护研究”（2013W11
