本文从最终控制人角度，利用中国A股市场2004年-2009年的7146个公司年数据对最终控制人特征与会计稳健性之间的关系进行了检验，并进一步探讨了中国上市公司中会计稳健性存在的根本动因。基于经验证据我们发现，会计稳健性在我国资本市场上伴随着控制权私利的存在而存在，并且最终控制人为了掩盖其“掏空”行为，会利用稳健的会计信息来实现其所获得的控制权私利。研究结果表明，在我国资本市场中，会计稳健性并不能作为一种有效的公司治理机制加强投资者保护。Using a new data set of 7146 firm-year observations from China during the period of 2003-2009，we examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and ultimate share-holders' characteristics. In addition, we investigate the factors that drive accounting conservatism in China's capital markets. The evidence suggests that accounting conservatism is associatcd with the higher private benefits of control for the listed firms in China. In order to conceal the private benefits of control through tunneling, ultimate shareholders appear to intentionally mislead investors with the conservative accounting information. Our empirical evidence suggests that accounting conservatism cannot be taken as an effective corporate governance mechanism to protect minority investors in China's capital markets.作者单位：内蒙古财经大学会计学
