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影子银行体系的监管问题——基于最优资本监管模型的分析
Authors
叶芳
朱孟楠
王宇光
赵茜
Publication date
12 July 2012
Publisher
Abstract
本文结合当前影子银行的国际监管现状及我国的实际情况,对Plantin(2012)构建的最优资本监管模型进行拓展。模型分析表明,引入影子银行后,对传统银行更加严格的监管会导致影子银行的活动更加活跃,并降低社会总体福利。因此,为提高社会福利,应避免对传统银行过于严格的管制。对影子银行的活动,在传统银行受监管较严时实行部分监管,而在传统银行受监管较松时实行全面的监管。考虑到我国影子银行体系发展的特殊性,继续推进利率市场化改革,营造更为宽松的金融信贷环境,有助于减少监管套利;正确引导和规范影子银行要优于对其严格的管制
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Last time updated on 16/06/2016