Obesity poses an urgent threat to children’s health. The causes of obesity are many and varied, but evidence suggests that the food industry makes a significant contribution. Multinational companies use a range of communication channels and marketing techniques to promote unhealthy foods and beverages to children. This promotion has a small but significant effect on children’s food preferences and choices, their consumption patterns and diet-related health. While public health advocates call for statutory regulation of unhealthy food advertising, the food industry has mobilised government support for voluntary action. In Australia, there is significant debate over the success of two self-regulatory codes that address food advertising to children. In this thesis I evaluate the food industry’s initiatives using a new approach. Although I consider evidence of the codes’ outcomes, I focus on whether they establish the building blocks of an effective self-regulatory regime. I use regulatory studies and public health law to create a framework for evaluation, drawing particularly on the idea of responsive regulation. I also compare food, tobacco and alcohol advertising regulation to predict whether statutory regulation of food advertising is practical and politically feasible. I find that food and alcohol advertising codes contain a series of ‘escape clauses’ that permit companies to continue with most of their marketing practices. As a result, the codes do not significantly reduce children’s exposure to food and alcohol advertising, or moderate the persuasive techniques used by marketers. Food industry self-regulation lacks the features of a well-designed voluntary scheme, including clear objectives, independent administration and monitoring, effective enforcement and systematic review. Further, regulatory processes are almost entirely industry based, meaning that the scheme is not accountable to external stakeholders. The difficulty of conducting research in this area underscores this conclusion. Food and alcohol companies report high levels of compliance with the codes, and an ethical commitment to responsible marketing practices. However, the initiatives do not place demanding requirements on participants; they only codify existing best practice in advertising to children. Further, industry initiatives exclude some of the main food and alcohol advertisers. In comparison to tobacco, food and alcohol products are highly varied, making regulation a more complex exercise. More fundamentally, these industries have an economic interest in advertising unhealthy products to a wide range of age groups. Accordingly, they are unlikely to accept any tighter restrictions on advertising to children, which might impact on their communication with adult audiences. One way of strengthening self-regulation is to include external stakeholders in regulatory processes. Public health actors engage with the food and alcohol industry (unlike the tobacco industry), creating the potential for more collaborative arrangements. However, experience with the ‘quasi-regulation’ of alcohol advertising illustrates that public health participation may not create a more transparent and accountable scheme. Also, external participation in industry schemes is highly contentious, and public health actors risk their credibility and reputation in doing so. Accordingly, government action is required to broaden the reach of self-regulation and improve its functioning. Given the strong case for government action, the question becomes what form it should take. There are significant political barriers to legislation, including the power of the food industry, and neo-liberal ideologies that favour minimal regulation. Accordingly, I consider options outside of ‘command-and-control’ regulation. Through co-regulation, the government could set clear objectives for the codes to achieve, establish an independent body for monitoring and enforcement, and formalise its oversight of the scheme. It must also threaten the industry with more intrusive regulation, should the improved scheme fail to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. This strategy implicitly endorses a responsive regulatory approach that begins with voluntary action by the food industry itself. However, it also recognises the central role of the state in regulation, and describes new ways for governments to protect public health
