Shortest path computation is one of the most common queries in location-based
services (LBSs). Although particularly useful, such queries raise serious
privacy concerns. Exposing to a (potentially untrusted) LBS the client's
position and her destination may reveal personal information, such as social
habits, health condition, shopping preferences, lifestyle choices, etc. The
only existing method for privacy-preserving shortest path computation follows
the obfuscation paradigm; it prevents the LBS from inferring the source and
destination of the query with a probability higher than a threshold. This
implies, however, that the LBS still deduces some information (albeit not
exact) about the client's location and her destination. In this paper we aim at
strong privacy, where the adversary learns nothing about the shortest path
query. We achieve this via established private information retrieval
techniques, which we treat as black-box building blocks. Experiments on real,
large-scale road networks assess the practicality of our schemes.Comment: VLDB201