Blind Quantum Computing (BQC) allows a client to have a server carry out a
quantum computation for them such that the client's input, output and
computation remain private. A desirable property for any BQC protocol is
verification, whereby the client can verify with high probability whether the
server has followed the instructions of the protocol, or if there has been some
deviation resulting in a corrupted output state. A verifiable BQC protocol can
be viewed as an interactive proof system leading to consequences for complexity
theory. The authors, together with Broadbent, previously proposed a universal
and unconditionally secure BQC scheme where the client only needs to be able to
prepare single qubits in separable states randomly chosen from a finite set and
send them to the server, who has the balance of the required quantum
computational resources. In this paper we extend that protocol with new
functionality allowing blind computational basis measurements, which we use to
construct a new verifiable BQC protocol based on a new class of resource
states. We rigorously prove that the probability of failing to detect an
incorrect output is exponentially small in a security parameter, while resource
overhead remains polynomial in this parameter. The new resource state allows
entangling gates to be performed between arbitrary pairs of logical qubits with
only constant overhead. This is a significant improvement on the original
scheme, which required that all computations to be performed must first be put
into a nearest neighbour form, incurring linear overhead in the number of
qubits. Such an improvement has important consequences for efficiency and
fault-tolerance thresholds.Comment: 46 pages, 10 figures. Additional protocol added which allows
arbitrary circuits to be verified with polynomial securit