textThis dissertation examines the role of political regimes in attracting foreign
investments in the oil sector. Despite similar pressures from global capital, the
degree of investment environment stability varies among states. Drawing on the
experiences of three oil-producing countries, Azerbaijan, Norway and Russia, I argue
that regime type determines the level of political competition for influence over
investment policies and the institutional mechanisms that shape it. Based on the
interaction of two dimensions - the number of veto players and the strength of
mediating institutions - I distinguish three distinct regime types that have varying
capacities in creating stable and attractive investment conditions for foreign investors.
The three cases studied in this dissertation illustrate that both consolidated
democracies and highly autocratic regimes are able to create stability in investment
relations, while hybrid regimes, that are in between the extreme ends of autocraticdemocratic continuum, are more likely to make arbitrary and unpredictable policy
changes that threaten the profitability and security of investment projects. I further
argue that the procurement of foreign capital, as well as the failure to procure it, has
effects on regime type. Once secured, foreign capital can reinforce both autocratic
and democratic regimes or in the case of hybrid regimes can push them in either an
autocratic or consolidating democratic direction. Hence, challenges of globalization
polarize the options available to political elites in hybrid regimes as they try to open
their economies to foreign investment.Governmen
