[FIRST PARAGRAPHS]
From Plato through Aquinas to Kant and beyond beauty has traditionally
been considered the paradigmatic aesthetic quality. Thus,
quite naturally following Socrates' strategy in The Meno, we are
tempted to generalize from our analysis of the nature and value of
beauty, a particular aesthetic value, to an account of aesthetic value
generally. When we look at that which is beautiful, the object gives
rise to a certain kind of pleasure within us. Thus aesthetic value is
characterized in terms of that which affords us pleasure. Of course,
the relation cannot be merely instrumental. Many activities may
lead to consequent pleasures that we would not consider to be aesthetic
in any way. For example, playing tennis, going swimming or
finishing a book. Rather it is in the very contemplation of the object
itself that we derive pleasure. As Kant puts it:
We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. The case is analogous (but analogous only) to the way we linger on a charm in the representation of an object which keeps arresting the attention, the mind all the while remaining passive.
Thus contemporary philosophers have, following this tradition, defined aesthetic value in terms of our delighting in and savouring an object with pleasure.* An object is of intrinsic aesthetic value if it appropriately gives rise to pleasure in our contemplation of it. Of course background knowledge of particular art movements, cate- gories or artistic intentions may be required to perceive an artwork appropriately. Nonetheless, given the relevant understanding, it is in attending to and savouring uhat is presented to us that we are afforded pleasure
