By the turn of the 21st century liberal democracy and democracy promotion have both become strongly entrenched norms in U.S. and E.U. foreign policies. Despite squabbles over a host of international issues, democracy as a system of government and an ideal is fundamentally shared by Americans and Europeans. Moreover, the erosion of state sovereignty and principles of non-intervention, as well as growing appreciation of the links between substantive democracy and economic development, peace and security, have made the goal of democracy promotion a shared one for Americans and Europeans. We argue that contemporary Europe and the United States are united by a normative commitment to democracy and the objective of supporting and promoting its development outside the transatlantic community. But does this mean that the E.U. and U.S. pursue the same democracy promotion strategies? We suggest that the answer is "sometimes, and sometimes not" and that it is dynamic. At times, and in different contexts, E.U. and U.S. strategies and instruments converge and diverge. Finally, we argue that divergence in strategies can be explained with reference to three key factors: the different histories and formative experiences that have shaped E.U. and U.S. thinking and institutions for promoting democracy abroad; differences in international "actorship"; and differences in conception of power
