de Gaulle, Charles

English

Archive of European Integration

Press Conference by President de Gaulle, Paris, 14 January 1963. Reproduced from WEU, Political Union of Europe, pp. 85-89

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
ASSEMBLY 
GENERAL AFFAIRS CODITTEE 
Tenth Ordinary Scuion 
Political union 
of 
\ 
UNION DE L'EUROPI OCCIDIINTALII 
ASSIIMBLSE 
CODISSION DES AFFWS GINIIALES 
Dixiblc ICUion ordinairc 
L'union politique 
de 1' 
EUROPE 
BrieL prepued 'by 
M. von MERKATZ, Rapporteur 
Paril, J unc 1964 PariJ, juin 1964 
DOOUJOINT.A.TIOl'f 
for if a structure, a firm, prosperous and attrac-
tive organisation, can be created in Western Eur-
ope - then there reappear the possibilit~ of a 
European. balance with the eastern States and the 
prospect of a truly European co-operation, parti-
cularly if, at the II&Dle time, the totalitarian re-
gime ceased to poison the springs. 
17, PNa eonfeNnce 
by Pralant de Gaulle, Pan. 1 
14tla JartaarJ 1118 
(EztrtJCts) 
Th,e Common Market 
Queltion: Could you define explicitly France's 
position towards Britain's entry into the Com-
mon Market and the political evolution of Eur-
ope f 
Answer: A very clear question, to which I shall 
endeavour to reply clearly. 
I believe that when you talk about econo-
mics - and much more so when you practise 
them - what you say and what you do must 
conform to realities, because without that you 
can get into impasses and, sometimes, you even 
head for ruin. 
In this very great affair of the European 
Economic Community and also in that of even-
tual adhesion of Great Britain, it is the facts 
that must first be considered. Feelings, favour-
able though they might be and are, these feel-
ings cannot be invoked against the real facts 
of the problem. What are these factsf 
The Treaty of Rome was concluded between 
six continental States, States which are, econo-
mically speaking, one may say, of the same 
nature. Indeed, whether it be a matter of their 
industrial or agricultural production, their exter-
nal exchanges, their habits or their commercial 
clientele, their living or working conditions, 
there is between them much more resemblance 
than difference. Moreover, they are adjacent, 
they inter-penetrate, they prolong each other 
through their communications. It is therefore a 
I. 8otwcf: Auembly of WEU, The Political Year in 
Europe, 1963. 
86 
fact to group them and to link them in such a 
way that what they have to produce, to buy, to 
sell, to consume - well, they do produce, buy, 
sell, consume, in preference in their own en-
semble. Doing that is conforming to realities. 
Moreover, it must be added that from the 
point of view of their economic development, 
their social progress, their technical capacity, 
they , are, in short, keeping pace. They are 
marching in similar fashion. It so happens, too, 
that there is between them no kind of political 
grievance, no frontier question, no rivalry in 
domination or power. On the contrary, they are 
joined in solidarity, especially and primarily, 
from the aspect of the consciousness they have 
of defining together an important part of the 
sources of our civilisation; and also as concerns 
their security, because they are continentals and 
have before them one and the same menace from 
one extremity to the other of their territorial 
ensemble. Then, finally, they are in solidarity 
through the fact that not one among them is 
bound abroad by any particular political or 
military accord. 
Thus it was psychologically and materially 
possible to make an economic community of the 
Six, though not without difficulties. When the 
Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, it was after 
long discussions; and when it was concluded, it 
was necessary - in order to achieve something 
- that we French put in order our economic, 
financial, and monetary affairs ... and that was 
done in 1959. From that moment the community 
was in principle viable, but then the treaty had 
to be applied. 
However, this treaty, which was precise and 
complete enough concerning industry, was not 
at all so on the subject of agriculture. However, 
for our country this had to be settled. Indeed, 
it is obvious that agriculture is an essential ele-
ment in the whole of our national activity. We 
cannot conceive, and will not conceive, of a Com-
mon Market in which French agriculture would 
not find outlets in keeping with its production. 
And we agree, further, that of the Six we are 
the country on which this necessity is imposed in 
the most imperative manner. 
This is why when, last January, thought 
was given to the setting in motion of the second 
phase · of the treaty - in other words a 
practical start in application - we were led to 
pose- the entry of agriculture into the Common 
DOOUJUNTATi:ON 
Market aa a formal condition. This was fina!lly 
accepted by our partnel'l but very difficult and 
very complex arrangements were needed - and 
some rulings are still outstanding. I tDote in 
passing that in this vast undertaking it was the 
govemmenta that took all the decisiona, because 
authority and responsibility are not to be found 
elsewhere. But I must say that in preparing and 
untangling these mattel'l, the Commission in 
Bruasel.s did aome very objective and fitting 
work. Thereupon Great Britain posed her candi-
dature to the Common llarket. She did it after 
having earlier refused to participate in the com-
munities we are now building, as well as after 
creating a free trade area with six other States, 
and, finally, after having- I may well say it 
(the negotiations held at such length on this sub-
ject will be recalled) - after having put some 
pressure on the Six to prevent a real beginning 
being made in the application of the Common 
Market. If England asks in turn to enter, but 
on her own conditions, this poses without doubt 
to each of the six States, and poses to England, 
problems of a very great dimension. 
England in effect is insular, she is mari-
time, she is linked through her exchanges, her 
markets, her supply lines to the most diverse 
and often the most diatant countries ; she pur-
sues essentially industrial and commercial activi-
ties, and only slight agricultural ones. She has 
in all her doings very marked and very original 
habits and traditions. 
In short, the nature, the structure, the very 
situation (conjuncture) that are England's differ 
profoundly from thoee of the continentals. What 
is to be done in order that England, as she lives, 
produces and trades, can be incorporated into 
the Common Market, as it has been conceived 
and as it functions t For example, the means 
by which the people of Great Britain are fed 
and which are in fact the importation of food-
stuffs bought cheaply in the two Americas and 
in the former dominions, at the same time giv-
ing, granting considerable subsidies to English 
farmers T These means are obviously incompat-
ible with the system which the Six have estab-
lished quite naturally for themselves. 
The system of the Six - this constitutes 
making a whole of the agricultural produce of 
the whole Community, in strictly fixing their 
prices, in prohibiting subsidies, in organising 
86 
their consumption between all the participants, 
and in imposing on each of ita participants 
payment to the Community of any saving they 
would achieve in fetching their food from out-
side instead of eating what the Common Market 
has to offer. Once again, what is to be done to 
bring England, as she is, into this system 7 
One might sometimes have believed that 
our English friends, in posing their candidature 
to the Common Market, were agreeing to trans-
form themselves to the point of applying all the 
conditions which are accepted and practised by 
the Six. But the question, to know whether Great 
Britain can now place herself like the Continent 
and with it inside a tariff which is genuinely 
common, to renounce all Commonwealth prefer-
ences, to cease any pretence that her agricul-
ture be privileged, and, more than that, to treat 
her engagements with other countries of the free 
trade area as null and void - that question is 
the whole question. 
It cannot be said that it is yet resolved. Will 
it be so one dayf Obviously only England can 
answer. The question is even further posed since 
after England other States which are, I repeat, 
linked to her through the free trade area, for the 
same reasons as Britain, would like or wish to 
enter the Common Market. 
It must be agreed that first the entry of 
Great Britain, and then these States, will com-
pletely change the whole of the actions, the 
agreements, the compensation, the rules which 
have already been established between the Six, 
because all these States, like Britain, have very 
important peculiarities. Then it will be another 
Common Market whose construction ought to be 
envisaged; but one which would be taken to 11 
and then 13 and then perhaps 18 would no lon-
ger resemble, without any doubt, the one which 
the Six built. 
Further, this community, increasing in such 
fashion, would see itself faced v.ith problems 
of economic relations with all kinds of other 
States, and first with the United States. It is 
to be foreseen that the cohesion of its members, 
who would be very numerous and diverse, would 
not endure for long, and that ultimately it would 
appear as a colossal Atlantic community under 
American dependence and direction, and which 
would quickly have absorbed the community of 
Europe .. 
DOCUMENTATION 
It is a hypothesis which in the eyes of some 
can be perfectly justified, but it is not at all 
what France is doing or wanted to do - and 
which is a properly European construction. 
Yet it is possible that one day England 
might manage to transform herself sufficiently 
to become part of the European community, 
without restriction, without reserve and prefer-
ence for anything whatsoever; and in this case 
the Six would open the door to her and France 
would raise no obstacle, although obviously Eng-
land's simple participation in the community 
would considerably change its nature and its 
volume. 
It is possible, too, that England might not 
yet be so disposed, and it is that which seems 
to result from the long, long, so long, so long 
Brussels conversations. But if that is the case, 
there is nothing there that could be dramatic. 
First, whatever decision England takes in this 
matter there is no reason, as far as we are con-
cerned, for the relations we have with her to be 
changed, and the consideration, the respect which 
are due to this great State, this great people, will 
not thereby be in the slightest impaired. 
What England has done across the cen-
turies and in the world is recognised as immense. 
Although there have often been conflicts with 
France, Britain's glorious participation in the 
victory which crowned the first world war - we 
French, we shall always admire it. As for the 
role England played in the most dramatic and 
decisive moments of the second world war, no 
one has the right to forget it. 
In truth, the destiny of the free world, and 
first of all ours and even that of the United 
States and Russia, depended in a large measure 
on the resolution, the solidity and the courage 
of the English people, as Churchill was able to 
harness them. Even at the present moment no 
one can contest British capacity and worth. 
Moreover, I repeat, if the Brussels negotia-
tions were shortly not to succeed, nothing would 
prevent the conclusion between the Common 
Market and Great Britain of an accord of asso-
ciation designed to safeguard exchanges, and 
nothing would prevent close relations between 
England and France from being maintained, nor 
the pursuit and development of their direct co-
operation in all kinds of fields, and notably the 
87 
scientific, technical and industrial - as the two 
countries have just proved by deciding to build 
together the supersonic aircraft Concorde. 
Lastly, it is very possible that Britain's own 
evolution, and the evolution of the universe, 
might bring the English little by little towards 
the Continent, whatever delays the achievement 
might demand, and for my part, that is what I 
readily believe, and that is why, in my opinion, 
it will in any case have been a great honour for 
the British Prime Minister, for my friend Harold 
Macmillan, and for his Government, to have 
discerned in good time, to have had enough poli-
tical courage to have proclaimed it, and to have 
led their country the first steps down the path 
which one day, perhaps, will lead it to moor 
alongside the Continent. 
The Nassau Agreements 
Question : What is France's attitud-e with regard 
to President Kennedy's plan for a multilateral 
solution, i. e. the Bahamas Agreements T 
Answer: We are in the atomic era and we are 
a country which can be destroyed at any 
moment, unless the aggressor is deterred from 
attack by the certainty that he too wiH suffer 
terrible destruction. There is thus justification 
for both alliance and independence. 
The Americans, our friends and allies, for 
a long time alone possessed the nuclear weapon. 
As long as they had a monopoly of such wea-
pons and showed their determination to use them 
immediately Europe. was attacked - for then 
only Europe could be attacked - there was 
little question of invasion as far as France was 
concerned, attack being improbable ... 
At that time the deterrent was fully effec-
tive and constituted a practically insurmountable 
obstacle to the invasion of Europe ... 
Since then, the Soviets too have formed a 
nuclear force and this force is powerful enough 
to threaten even the life of America ... 
From that moment, the immediate defence 
and the priority given to the defence of Europe, 
DOOUHENT~TION 
the military assistance of the Europeans which 
formerly were basic factors in their strategy, 
by necessity, became secondary considerations. 
The recent Cuban affair made this apparent ... 
Further, the means they decided immedi-
ately to use to meet a direct attack, whether from 
Cuba alone or combined with another from else-
where, were automatically directed towards an 
objective other than the defence of Europe, even 
though the latter might have been attacked in 
turn. And then, to cap all, the Russians have 
a deterrent as well as the Americans, which 
means that in the event of overall nuclear war-
fare there would inevitably be fearful and per-
haps mortal destruction wreaked in both coun-
tries. In these circumstances no one in the world, 
and particularly in America, can say whether, 
where, when, how and to what extent American 
ntrclear weapons would be used to defend 
Europe ... 
But it remains that the American nuclear 
power does not meet necessarily and immediately 
all eventualities concerning Europe and France. 
Thus, principles and circumstances combine 
to make it incumbent upon France to acquire its 
own nuclear force. Of course, this does not pre-
vent this force being used in combination with 
similar forces belonging to France's allies. But 
for us, integration in this respect is inconceiv-
able. Indeed, everyone knows we began, without 
any outside help whatsoever, to invent, experi-
ment with, and construct nuclear bombs and 
means of delivery. 
It is quite understandable that this French 
initiative should not seem very satisfactory in 
certain American circles. In questions of policy 
and strategy as well as economy, those who have 
a monopoly naturally consider this the best pos-
sible system. We consequently hear a combined 
chorus of busybodies, specialists and American 
publicists raising their voices violently and 
loudly in opposition to our independent arms. 
''The nuclear force France intends to equip her-
self with is and will remain," they say, "minute 
compared with that of the United States and 
Russia. It is throwing a lot of money and effort 
away to build such a force. And again, the 
United States have overwhelming superiority 
88 
within the Alliance, so their strategy should not 
be opposed by divergent action ! '' 
It is perfectly true that the quantity of 
nuclear means with which we will be able to 
equip ourselves will be far from matching the 
mass of those of the two giants of today. But 
since when has it been proved that a people 
should remain deprived of the most efficient 
weapons just because its main possible opponent 
and its main friend have means which &t'!l 
clearly superior Y... 
I merely wish to say that from the very 
outset the French nuclear force will have the 
sombre and terrible ability to destroy in a few 
seconds millions and millions of men. This fact 
cannot fail to have at least some influence on 
the intentions of a possible aggressor. 
Then, in the Bahamas, America and Britain 
concluded an agreement to which we also were 
asked to adhere. Naturally, I am only speaking 
of this proposal and this agreement because they 
have been published and their tenor is known. 
This involves building up a so-called multilateral 
force to which Britain is to contribute its present 
and future means and the Americans some of 
theirs. 
This multilateral force is assigned to the 
defence of Europe under the American command 
of NATO. It is understood, however, that the 
British retain the right to resume command of 
their nuclear means should this appear to be 
necessary in the higher interests of the country. 
The main force of American nuclear means re-
mains outside the multilateral force under the 
direct command of the President of the United 
States. 
Further, and in fact in compensation, Bri-
tain can buy from America, if she so wishes, Po-
laris missiles which, as is known, are launched 
from submarines built for this purpose and which 
carry their thermonuclear projectiles over dis-
tances of 2,000 or 3,000 kilometers. The British 
have the benefit of American assistance for 
building these submarines and projectiles. I 
might add in this respect, that such assistance 
has never been offered to us and in spite of 
what has been said, it must be stated that we 
have never requested it. 
DOOUJUIINTA.TION 
France has taken note of the Anglo-Ameri-
can agreement in the Bahamas. In view of its 
terms, no one will be surprised that we are un-
able to subscribe to it. It would really be no use 
for us to buy Polaris missiles when we have 
neither the submarines to launch them nor the 
thermonuclear warheads to arm them. No doubt 
the day will come when we shall have these 
submarines and nuclear warheads. But it is not 
for tomorrow because the world war, invasion 
and their sequels have considerably delayed our 
nuclear development. The day we have these 
submarines and warheads, what will the Polaris 
be worth 7 Probably by then we shall have mis-
siles we have invented ourselves. In other words, 
for us, technically speaking, this is not what 
might be called a topical proposition. 
But also it docs not fulfil the principle I 
mentioned just now which is to have our own 
deterrent force. To pour our means into a multi-
lateral force under foreign command would be 
89 
running counter to this principle of our defence 
and our policy. It is true that we too may be 
able, in theory, to retain the right to regain con-
trol of those of our forces which are incorporated 
in the multilateral force in cases of absolute ne-
ceSBity. But how would we do it in practice in 
the unparalleled moments of nuclear apocalypse T 
Then again, this multilateral force would neces-
sarily involve such an entanglement of liaisons, 
internal interference, and external constraints 
that if an integral part of it were suddenly 
snatched away there would be a great danger of 
paralysing it just at the moment when perhaps 
it would have to go into action. 
Thus we abide by the decision we have 
reached : to build and, if necessary, to use our 
own nuclear force. Of course, in doing so we 
shall not refuse co-operation, whether technical 
or strategic, if that is the wish of our allies ... 


Press Conference by President de Gaulle, Paris, 14 January 1963. Reproduced from WEU, Political Union of Europe, pp. 85-89

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