Dufner, Annette

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This article was downloaded by: [Institut Fuer Tierernaehrung/Fli]On: 22 January 2013, At: 01:24Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UKThe American Journal of BioethicsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20Potentiality Arguments and the Definition of “HumanOrganism”Annette Dufner aa University of MuensterVersion of record first published: 11 Jan 2013.To cite this article: Annette Dufner (2013): Potentiality Arguments and the Definition of “Human Organism”, The AmericanJournal of Bioethics, 13:1, 33-34To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2012.747033PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLEFull terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionsThis article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form toanyone is expressly forbidden.The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses shouldbe independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims,proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly inconnection with or arising out of the use of this material.Potentiality and Embryo ProtectionThese considerations suggest that Stier and Schoene-Seifert have not made their case even when we think of thekinds of cases they are considering. Just what we should sayabout the potentialities of, say, zygotes is, in my view, very,very difficult (Marquis 2007; in book form, Gruen, Grabel,and Singer 2007). It requires more analysis than either Stierand Schoene-Seifert provide or than I have provided here.Nevertheless, we may safely conclude that potentialitieshave a robust role to play in moral judgments concerningissues in medicine. REFERENCESGruen, L., L. Grabel, and P. Singer (eds.). 2007. Stem cell research: Theethical issues, 51–66. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Marquis, D. 2007. The moral-principle objection to humanembryonic stem cell research. Metaphilosophy 38(2–3): 190–206.Stier, M., and B. Schoene-Seifert. 2013. The argument from poten-tiality in the embryo protection debate: Finally “depotentialized”?American Journal of Bioethics 13(1): 19–27.Potentiality Arguments and theDefinition of “Human Organism”Annette Dufner, University of MuensterBettina Schöne-Seifert and Marco Stier (2013) present a hostof detailed and intriguing arguments to the effect that po-tentiality arguments have to be viewed as outdated due todevelopments in stem cell research, in particular the pos-sibility of resetting the development potential of differenti-ated cells, such as skin cells. If the development potential ofthe embryo is not a unique and thereby viable indicator ofmoral status anymore, one may wonder which other prop-erty could be employed for this purpose. Clearly, there hasto be a point in development at which human beings—incontrast to individual skin cells—start possessing a moralstatus that gives them a claim not to be consumed for re-search purposes.A leading liberal proposal that has influenced the dis-cussion context in which Schöne-Seifert and Stier have beenworking is the possibility of conferring moral status to hu-man life at the point at which twinning is not possible any-more (suggested in particular by legal scholar Horst Dreier).From a legal perspective this suggestion can be made com-pelling by pointing out that subjective rights, such as a rightto life, or a right not to be consumed for research purposes,require a particular subject as the carrier of those rights.Arguably, in those development stages in which twinningis still possible, we are not dealing with a particular humansubject yet, because we do not know yet how many subjectswill develop, and whether there will be any at all.However, the claim that we do not know yet how many,if any, adult subjects will develop is of course a potentialityargument that Schöne-Seifert and Stier have to be criticalof. This leaves them without an account for an appropriatecutoff time in human development. Moreover, a further dis-advantage of the leading proposal consists in the fact thatthe conclusion from divisibility to nonindividuation mightwell be wrong. The fact that human life in the morula stage,Address correspondence to Annette Dufner, University of Muenster, Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics, Geiststr. 24-26, Muenster48151, Germany. E-mail: annette.dufner@uni-muenster.defor example, is still divisible does not logically imply thatwe are not dealing with one particular morula right now.This morula happens to be divisible, but this has no logi-cal implication for its individuation as one particular currententity (pointed out in particular by Michael Quante), whichmay well serve as the carrier of certain rights.An alternative proposal that should be of interest to bothproponents and critics of stem cell research would be to startworking with the concept of a human organism. Arguably,a skin cell is merely part of a human organism, while anembryo is at some point a human organism. According tothis argumentative strategy one should confer moral statusnot to all human life, including skin cells, but merely toliving human organisms. A suitable working definition ofan organism might be something like the following:An organism is an entity in which multiple biological systemsor processes of different kinds function in a particularly inte-grated way and at least somewhat autonomously from theirenvironment.On the basis of such a working definition, one couldargue that a skin cell does not display the required proper-ties. Arguably the skin cell is not autonomous enough fromits environment, specifically due to its present differentia-tion and function as a skin cell. Notice that this would notbe a potentiality argument, since it would focus on presentproperties, rather than future ones.Dogmatic opponents of stem cell research might wantto insist that the fertilized ovum already constitutes an or-ganism. They would then have to show that the biologicalintegration and autonomy of the fertilized ovum exceedsthe integration and autonomy of systems or processes thatwe do not take to be organisms. What such an argumentcould look like and whether it would be successful cannotJanuary, Volume 13, Number 1, 2013 ajob 33Downloaded by [Institut Fuer Tierernaehrung/Fli] at 01:24 22 January 2013 The American Journal of Bioethicsbe the subject of a brief commentary. In any case, it is to beexpected that the argument is easier to make in later devel-opment stages, even though it might not be impossible tomake it for this very early stage.Since stem cells are currently extracted in the blastocyststage, it is of particular interest how promising it wouldbe to insist that a blastocyst constitutes an organism. Obvi-ously a blastocyst is made up of a number of cells, whichmight strengthen the claim that we are looking at multiplebiological systems or processes. Moreover, in contrast to theearlier morula, the cells of the blastocyst seem to serve dif-ferent functions: The tightly connected outer cell mass (thetrophoblast) seems to serve the purpose of holding liquidaround the inner cell mass (the embryoblast). As a result,it may be justified to ascribe coordinated and integratedfunctioning to the two different kinds of cells, as well as aminimal degree of autonomy from the environment in thesense of a tight outer border restricting the passage of liq-uid. This implies that there is room for the argument thatthe blastocyst forms a human organism, while the skin celldoes not. If this position works, destroying blastocysts byextracting stem cells would be morally more problematicthan the destruction of skin cells.An obvious objection to this argument would be to insistthat the functional differences and the integration betweenthe different kinds of cells in the blastocyst are irrelevant. Inparticular, one might be tempted to insist that the outer cellmass is morally irrelevant, because those cells will not de-velop into the baby; merely the inner cell mass will do this.However, this would be a potentiality argument. Research-friendly critics of the prohibitive argument should not basetheir views on the fact that the outer cell mass does nothave the potential to turn into a baby. It might be morepromising to criticize the prohibitive argument by insistingthat the functional differences between the cells in the in-ner and in the outer cell mass are not sufficient to satisfythe requirement of “integrated biological systems or pro-cesses of different kinds.” Even though the outer cell massseems to serve the function of containing liquid within theblastocyst, in other ways the degree of cellular differenti-ation in the inner and outer cells seems to be the same. Ifthis argument can be made compelling, then the blastocystdoes not constitute a human organism yet and extractingstem cells from it would be morally less problematic thanextracting them at a later stage at which the organism re-quirements are already fulfilled in a less controversial way.Which result the application of an appropriate work-ing definition of “organism” would actually yield cannotbe decided here. In any case, though, the strategy seemsto have the potential of redividing the argumentative land-scape along familiar lines. As Schöne-Seifert and Stier cor-rectly anticipate, though, such alternative attempts at find-ing an appropriate cutoff line for moral status will shiftthe focus away from potentiality arguments, which indeedseem to have become “depotentialized” in light of the de-velopments discussed in their article. REFERENCEStier, M., and B. Schoene-Seifert. 2013. The argument from poten-tiality in the embryo protection debate: Finally “depotentialized”?American Journal of Bioethics 13(1): 19–27.Prematurely Depotentialized? EthicalNonnaturalism and theAbsurdest-Extension ObjectionSebastian Muders, Universität ZürichMarkus Ruether, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität MünsterSchoene-Seifert’s and Stier’s thought-provoking target arti-cle (2013) addresses so many complex issues that it seemsimpossible to provide a comprehensive commentary in thisspace. Therefore, we confine our remarks to a special dis-cussion of the absurdest-extension argument (AEA), whichstrikes us as central to their claim that the argument frompotentiality (PA) cannot survive. In short, AEA runs likethis:Address correspondence to Sebastian Muders, Universität Zürich, Ethik-Zentrum, Zollikerstr. 117, Zürich, 8008, Switzerland. E-mail:sebastian.muders@ethik.uzh.chP1: Recent developments in cellular biology have shownthat we can create totipotent cells via tetraploid com-plementation.P2: If this is true, we cannot distinguish the potentialityof these cells prior to their reprogramming from thepotentiality of embryonic cells.K: Therefore, reprogrammable cells have the same moralstatus as embryonic cells.34 ajob January, Volume 13, Number 1, 2013Downloaded by [Institut Fuer Tierernaehrung/Fli] at 01:24 22 January 2013 

Potentiality Arguments and the Definition of “Human Organism”

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