This research was designed to answer the question of which direction the restructuring of financial regulators should take – consolidation or fragmentation.
This research began by examining the need for financial regulation and its related costs. It then continued to describe what types of regulatory structures exist in the world; surveying the regulatory structures in 15 jurisdictions, comparing them and discussing their strengths and weaknesses.
This research analyzed the possible regulatory structures using three methodological tools: Game-Theory, Institutional-Design, and Network-Effects.
The incentives for regulatory action were examined in Chapter Four using game theory concepts. This chapter predicted how two regulators with overlapping supervisory mandates will behave in two different states of the world (where they can stand to benefit from regulating and where they stand to lose). The insights derived from the games described in this chapter were then used to analyze the different supervisory models that exist in the world.
The problem of information-flow was discussed in Chapter Five using tools from institutional design. The idea is based on the need for the right kind of information to reach the hands of the decision maker in the shortest time possible in order to predict, mitigate or stop a financial crisis from occurring.
Network effects and congestion in the context of financial regulation were discussed in Chapter Six which applied the literature referring to network effects in general in an attempt to conclude whether consolidating financial regulatory standards on a global level might also yield other positive network effects.
Returning to the main research question, this research concluded that in general the fragmented model should be preferable to the consolidated model in most cases as it allows for greater diversity and information-flow. However, in cases in which close cooperation between two authorities is essential, the consolidated model should be used
