Design Information Verification (DIV) is becoming increasingly important in International Safeguards as a way of verifying that facility set-up is consistent with the declared design and activities. This is particularly true for the complex environments of new nuclear installations. Member States Support Programmes (MSSPs) enabled the IAEA to develop and obtain a set of advanced tools designed to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of DIV activities. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of these advanced tools based on laser, radar, X-ray fluorescence and infrared imaging technologies and their potential for being applied to containment- and other verification activities.JRC.E.9-Nuclear security (Ispra

GONCALVES Joao

JUNG Stefan

LEBRUN Alain

MOESLINGER Martin

POIRIER Stéphanie

SEQUEIRA Vitor

JRC Publications Repository

 1  
   
 
Paper Number: IAEA-CN-184/258 
 
 
MODERN SAFEGUARDS TOOLS FOR 
EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION 
 
S. Jung, A. Lebrun, M. Moeslinger, S. Poirier, International Atomic Energy Agency, Austria 
V. Sequeira, J. Goncalves, European Commission, JRC 
 
Email Address of Main Author: 
s.jung@iaea.org 
 
Abstract 
Design Information Verification (DIV) is becoming increasingly important in International Safeguards as a 
way of verifying that facility set-up is consistent with the declared design and activities. This is particularly 
true for the complex environments of new nuclear installations. Member States Support Programmes 
(MSSPs) enabled the IAEA to develop and obtain a set of advanced tools designed to improve the 
efficiency and the effectiveness of DIV activities. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of these 
advanced tools based on laser, radar, X-ray fluorescence and infrared imaging technologies and their 
potential for being applied to containment- and other verification activities. 
Introduction 
By performing design information verification (DIV) the IAEA probes the completeness and correctness of 
the design information provided by operators of nuclear installations as part of their obligations under the 
Safeguards treaties. The verification has the aim to discover possible undeclared activities and material. To 
this end, critical locations and process steps of the plant have to be identified and checked.  
Mostly, DIV have been performed by using blueprints and visual observation, complemented by simple 
hand-held instruments. A more sophisticated approach is getting important after the coming in force of  
additional protocols and integrated safeguards. 
In this paper we will present some specific tools for DIV that were selected and authorized for Safeguards 
use in the last few years. Typically, these make use of techniques developed in other fields, like the broad 
range of geophysical methods, or of recent advances of instrumentation and sensors, like laser technologies. 
Tried and true technologies become portable tools due to miniaturisation of electronic components and 
affordable through economies of scale, like infra red imaging. Specifically, we will briefly discuss portable 
X-ray fluorescence devices, ground penetrating radar (GPR), and infrared imaging (IR). The biggest part of 
the discussion will be devoted to the 3D laser range finder (3DLR). Possibilities for further development 
will also be discussed.  
X-ray fluorescence (XRF) 
XRF provides the capability for the characterisation of various metals and alloys and possible dual-use 
materials by means of X-ray fluorescence. The sample is irradiated by an X-ray photon field generated by 
an X-ray tube. The characteristic X-ray fluorescence spectrum emitted by the sample is then measured. 
XRF allows the relative determination of the constituents of metals, alloys or other materials in different 
forms (pipes, rotors, bulk). Due to the measurement principle, only the surface of a given material can be 
analysed.  
XRF is a non-destructive technique that has been used in industrial applications for decades, e.g. in 
reception control. Due to the development of small X-ray tubes, portable instruments have been developed 
which can positively identify most types of alloys in a matter of seconds. For this application, portable XRF 
 
 
devices require little or no data analysis by the user.  
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Channel Number
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Cu (Kα) 8keV
Cu (Kβ) 8.9keV
Zn (Kα) 8.64keV
Zn (Kβ) 9.57keV
 
Figure 1: XRF Spectrum collected using SiLi detector for NIST reference material number 1107 (C1107) 
treated as “unknown sample”. The spectrum shows the intensity of the dominant constituent of the sample. 
Measurement results are given in the table below. 
Element   declared concentration (%)   measured concentration (%) 
Cu            59.0                                       63.70 
Zn            40.0                                       37.45 
Fe             0.0004                                   0.2582 
Ni             0.025                                     0.2381 
Table: Declared and measured concentration of the reference sample (NIST 1107, C1107) using elemental 
sensitivity method 
Ground penetrating radar (GPR) 
GPR uses pulses of electromagnetic radiation in the microwave band (UHF/VHF frequencies) of the radio 
spectrum, and reads the reflected signal to detect subsurface structures and objects without drilling, probing 
or otherwise breaking the ground surface. Applications include locating buried voids/cavities, underground 
storage tanks, sewers, buried foundations, ancient landfills. It can also be used to characterize bedrock, the 
internal structure of floors/walls, water damage in concrete, and the internal steelwork in concrete.  
GPR uses transmitting and receiving antennae. The transmitting antenna radiates short pulses of the high-
frequency radio waves into the ground. When the wave hits a buried object or a boundary with different 
electrical properties, the receiving antenna records variations in the reflected return signal. The principles 
involved are similar to reflection seismology, except that electromagnetic energy is used instead of acoustic 
energy. The range of the scan is affected mostly by the conductivity and composition of the ground; the 
resolution of the scan is affected by the scanning frequency. Higher frequencies do not penetrate as far as 
lower frequencies, but give better resolution. Best penetration is achieved in dry sandy soils or massive dry 
materials such as granite, limestone, and concrete where the depth of penetration is up to 15 meters. In 
moist and/or clay soils and soils with high electrical conductivity, penetration is sometimes less than 1 
meter.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Off-the-shelf GPR equipment as used by IAEA for inside and outside scans, assaying structures in 
the ground (250 and 500 MHz antenna depending on application) 
30 cm
 
Figure 3: 1.5 GHz GPR profiles on a post-tensioned beam. In the lower part, the data are processed 
(migration with v=0.12 m/ns and Hilbert transform)). 
Figure 3 shows raw data, schematic structure and post-processed GPR data of a post-tensioned beam, 
Figure 4 displays schematic positions and unprocessed GRP scan of a metal box through a floor.  
 
 
Figure 4: Metal box below floor; schematic (left), GPR signal (right) 
  
 
 
Infra red imaging 
Industrial processes that might be indicative of nuclear activities can give rise to temperature differences in 
pipework that may be visualised by infrared imaging, even through walls. Temperature differences can also 
indicate building structures of different heat parameters.  
 
Figure 5: Off-the-shelf infra red camera as used by IAEA for IR imaging (temperature resolution 0.1 K at 
30 C, measurement accuracy ±2% over –measurement range -40 C to 1200 C) 
Typical examples are shown in Figure 6 and visualising pipework and building structures, respectively, 
contrasting visual and IR images.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Utility room for heating and cooling, left visual image, right IR image 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Identification of slabs or walls – visual image above and IR image below at end of sunny 
afternoon 
3D Laser-Rangefinder (3DLR) 
3DLR is a tool developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) Ispra to assist inspectors in performing their 
Design Information Verification (DIV) duties, at a given environment, is based on the comparison of two 
3D models acquired at different instants in time. To initiate the DIV process there is the need to define at a 
given time the reference model for the given plant. This reference model should be as complete and 
accurate as possible as it will be subsequently used as term of comparison.  
Building a 3D Reference Model. 
The Reference Model consists basically in the 3D geometric surface description of a given environment. 
The reference model provides a good description of the area, or, more exactly, volume, under observation. 
The quality of the DIV activities is highly dependent on how accurately and realistically the “as-built” 3D 
model documents the plant. As such, the reference model should be acquired with the best possible 
conditions including a) higher spatial resolution, b) lower measurement noise and c) multiple views to cover 
possible occlusions. The number of required scans depends on the complexity of the scene. In addition, any 
source of data containing a 3D representation of the reference area can be used. Available CAD models can 
be used as a reference of the ideal construction. 
Initial Verification of the 3D models 
This verification is performed by comparing the 3D Model versus the CAD model or the engineering 
drawing provided by the plant operator. In the case of unavailability of CAD models, survey data such as 
distance measurements, accurate calculation of container diameters, heights, pipe diameters and other 
complex distances impossible by traditional measurement tools can be made in the virtual 3D environment.  
Re-verification. 
Following a specific Safeguards approach and criteria, an area for verification is selected, and a new 3D 
model is created with fresh data.  The new model is then compared with the Reference model and changes 
automatically identified. The result of the change-detection is a displacement-map for each element in the 
verification scan. The automatic detected changes can be further analyzed by an inspector using 
visualization enhancing tools. Detected changes should then be investigated and documented by the 
Safeguards inspector. The re-verification phase can occur at any time after the reference model is 
constructed.  
3DLR System 
The main components of the 3DLR system are:  
a) 3D Data acquisition equipment 
b) Software tools to create 3D models of the environment “as built” 
c) Software tools capable of automatically detecting changes between the current 3D reconstructed model 
and a previous model used as reference 
d) Software tools to track and document changes in successive inspections.  
A laser range scanner is used to acquire the 3D data which, when processed and integrated, will constitute 
the model describing a given environment. Figure 8 shows the complete 3DLR system.  
 
 
The laser scanner can be placed “stand-alone” or on a tripod with a dolly. One should note that a single scan 
does not normally capture all the geometry of a scene. This is due to the presence of occlusions (i.e., objects 
hidden behind another object). As such, multiple scans from different positions are needed to create a 
complete model.  
    
Figure 8:  3DLR laser scanner system with tripod 
 
At this point, one should note that the whole system is designed such that when acquiring data for the 
verification, there is absolutely no need to locate the laser scanner at the same position from where the 
reference model was built. Further, the laser scanning equipment can be different, i.e., with different 
measurement accuracy as well as different spatial and depth resolutions. 3DLR allows safeguards inspectors 
to identify and focus on objects which have been moved more than a specified amount – interactively set by 
the inspector. Figure 2 shows an inspection result with this colour coding technique. 
The result can be treated in such a way that areas or volumes which have distance changes above a 
threshold are saved to an inspection log file containing a global unique location reference (xyz location and 
extension). 
    
Figure 2: Reference model (L), verification scan (M), automatically detected differences in red (R) 
There are two main advantages of the 3DLR system: 
a) It is possible to create a highly accurate representation – millimetre accuracy – of the scene under 
verification in a few minutes. This representation can be as complete as desired and the inspector has 
full control on data quality; 
b) Given the accuracy and completeness, it is possible to detect any structural change, even minor, 
introduced in the plant. This further provides confidence in the capabilities of the 3DLR system. 
UTILISATION AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF 3DLR 
After a first prototype in 2002, JRC continued the development of the 3DLR targeted to IAEA needs. The 
system was tested and used at a Japanese facility [4]. Being a new technology the applications for 3DLR 
extend beyond DIV. Consequently the technology is currently being tested for scene change detection at 
 
 
large storage areas and as a reactor containment verification tool. It is expected that improvements can 
come from future commercial 3D laser scanning devices – faster, with better spatial resolution and more 
accurate. Further, practical input and feedback received from end-users (i.e., inspectors) will be taken into 
account for future versions of the software.  
 
References 
[1] X. Derobert, D. Leparoux, J-L Chazelas, “Reference Manual for GPR investigation”, LCPC 2006, 
French Support Programme task A1438. 
[2]  “IR possibilities”, LCPC 2009, report under French Support Programme task A1438. 
[3] V. Sequeira, K. C. Ng, E. Wolfart, J.G.M Gonçalves, and D.C. Hogg. “Automated 3D Reconstruction 
of Interiors with Multiple Scan-views”, Proceedings of SPIE, Electronic Imaging '99, IS&T/SPIE's 
11th Annual Symposium pp. 106-117, San Jose Convention Center, San Jose, California, USA, 
January 1999. 
[4] Sequeira V., Ng K., Wolfart E., Gonçalves J.G.M. and Hogg D., "Automated Reconstruction of 3D 
Models from Real Environments", ISPRS Journal of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing 
(Elsevier), vol. 54, pp. 1-22, 1999. 
[5] Gonçalves J.G.M., Sequeira V., Chesnay B., Creusot C., Johnson S., Whichello J. – “3D Laser Range 
Scanner for Design Verification”, Proc. 44th INMM Annual Meeting, 2003. 
[6] Creusot C., Chesnay B., Johnson S., Yamauchi Y., Gonçalves J.G.M., Sequeira V. – “Innovative 
Approaches to DIE/DIV Activities at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant”, Proceedings of the 7th 
International Conference on Facility Operations – Safeguards Interface, Charleston, 2004. 
[7] European Commission Support Programme to the IAEA, Task EC-E-1425: 3D Laser Range Finder 
for Design Verification in RRP 
[8] Agboraw E., Johnson S., Creusot C., Poirier S., Saukkonen H., Chesnay B., Sequeira V. – “IAEA 
experience using the 3-Dimensional Laser Range Finder (3DLRF) for design information verification 
at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant “, Proc. IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 
Addressing Verification Challenges, Vienna, 2006. 
[9] Poirier S., Moeslinger M., Zendel M., Sequeira V., Boström G., Gonçalves J.G.M., Haslam S., 
Hughes K. – “The Use of 3D Laser Based Systems for Design Information Verification (DIV)”, Proc. 
50th INMM Annual Meeting, 2009. 
[10] Schwalbach P., Tsalas S., Dackner J., Zein A., Smejkal A., Chare P., Boella M., Gonçalves J.G.M., 
Sequeira V., Bostrom G. – “Modern Tools to Verify Basic Technical Characteristics of Nuclear 
Plants: Recent Initiatives of DG TREN” 
[11] Boström G., Gonçalves J.G.M., Okko O., Sequeira V. – “3D Laser Modelling of the Onkalo 
Geological Repository”, Proc. 49th INMM Annual Meeting, 2008. 
[12] Boström G., Fiocco M., Gonçalves J.G.M., Puig D., Sequeira V., Chartier B., Kiesser R., Mariotte F., 
Richard M., Zamora P.  – “3D Reconstruction in Nuclear Security”, ESARDA Bulletin, No. 38, PP. 
17-24, June 2008 
 
 
 


Modern Safeguards Tools for Efficient and Effective Design Information Verification

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Modern Safeguards Tools for Efficient and Effective Design Information Verification

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