A new analytical framework for studying protocol diversity in P2P networks

Abstract

Thanks to years of research and development, current peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are anything but a homogeneous system from a protocol perspective. Specifically, even for the same P2P system (e.g., BitTorrent), a large number of protocol variants have been designed based on game theoretic considerations with the objective to gain performance advantages. We envision that such variants could be deployed by selfish participants and interact with the original prescribed protocol as well as among them. Consequently, a meta-strategic situation - judiciously selection of different protocol variants - will emerge. In this work, we propose a general framework, Migration, based on evolutionary game theory to study the coevolution of peers for selfish protocol selection, and, most importantly, its impact on system performance. We apply Migration to P2P systems and draw on extensive simulations to characterize the dynamics of selfish protocol selection. The revealed evolution patterns shed light on both theoretical study and practical system design. © 2013 IEEE.published_or_final_versio