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research
On the impact of selfish behaviors in wireless packet scheduling
Authors
Z Kong
YK Kwok
J Wang
Publication date
1 January 2008
Publisher
'Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)'
Doi
Cite
Abstract
In many practical scenarios, wireless devices are autonomous and thus, may exhibit non-cooperative behaviors due to self-interests. For instance, a wireless user may report bogus channel information to gain resource allocation advantages. Such non-cooperative behaviors are practicable as the device's software could be modified by the user. In this paper, we first analyze the impact of these rationally selfish behaviors on the performance of packet scheduling algorithms in time-slotted wireless networks. Using a mixed strategy game theoretic model, we show that the traditional Maximum Rate packet scheduling algorithm can lead non-cooperative users to undesirable Nash equilibriums, in which the wireless channels are used inefficiently. By using repeated game to enforce cooperation, we further propose a novel game theoretic approach that can lead to an efficient equilibrium. ©2008 IEEE.published_or_final_versio
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Last time updated on 01/06/2016