Argumentation and data-oriented belief revision: On the two-sided nature of epistemic change

Abstract

This paper aims to bring together two separate threads in the formal study of epistemic change: belief revision and argumentation theories. Belief revision describes the way in which an agent is supposed to change his own mind, while argumentation deals with persuasive strategies employed to change the mind of other agents. Belief change and argumentation are two sides (cognitive and social) of the same epistemic coin. Argumentation theories are therefore incomplete, if they cannot be grounded in belief revision models - and vice versa. Nonetheless, so far the formal treatment of belief revision widely neglected any systematic comparison with argumentation theories. Such lack of integration poses severe limitations to our understanding of epistemic change, and more comprehensive models should instead be devised. After a short critical review of the literature (cf. 1), we outline an alternative model of belief revision whose main claim is the distinction between data and beliefs (cf. 2), and we discuss in detail its expressivity with respect to argumentation (cf. 3): finally, we summarize our conclusions and future works on the interface between belief revision and argumentation (cf. 4)